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
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A NARRATIVE
OF
The Political and Military
EVENTS AT NAPLES,
In 1820 and 1821.

A NARRATIVE

OF

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY



APPENDICES

EVENTS

1806-1815

1806-1815





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A NARRATIVE
OF
THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY
E V E N T S,

WHICH TOOK PLACE
AT NAPLES, IN 1820 AND 1821 ;

WITH
Observations

EXPLANATORY OF THE NATIONAL CONDUCT IN GENERAL,
AND OF HIS OWN IN PARTICULAR,
DURING THAT PERIOD.

—
ADDRESSED
TO HIS MAJESTY,
THE KING OF THE TWO SICILIES,
BY GENERAL WILLIAM PEPE.

—
WITH
AN APPENDIX OF OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS,

The greater Part hitherto unpublished.

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L O N D O N:

PUBLISHED BY
TREUTTEL AND WÜRTZ, TREUTTEL, JUN. AND RICHTER,
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1821.

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P R E F A C E.



I ADDRESS this Narrative, in the first place, to my own Sovereign ; and not less to men of all parties in the different Nations of Europe, who from a wayward disposition of the human heart, from unacquaintance with human nature, or ignorance of the most recent historical events, are disposed, and perhaps pleased, to load the unhappy Neapolitans with contempt. Deprived of all assistance, menaced on every side, and opposed in a thousand ways by a powerful enemy, who was seconded by their own king, they became the victims of an unseasonable confidence, and fell, from the want of discretion and

harmony, into the same cruel vicissitudes which at different epochs have befallen all the other nations of Europe, whose situation perhaps did not present so many difficulties to overcome, as those into which the Neapolitans saw themselves plunged. In fact, setting aside a variety of other instances, did not the French, that characteristically warlike people, who subsequently triumphed over all the armies of Europe, fly at the first cannon shot, in their first campaign in May 1792? Subsequently, as an apology for this disaster, did they not accuse of treason and put to death General Dillon? And yet what a difference in the position of the French in Flanders, and that of the Neapolitans in the Abruzzi! The French, disciplined by their civil dissensions, secure in their immense population and national strength, had to fight with an enemy who had for many years been unaccustomed to war; the Neapolitans on the contrary, in the Abruzzi, in want of everything, with a badly armed militia, assembled for the first time, had to contend with an army of at least four times their number,

disciplined by twenty-five years of obstinate warfare, and availing themselves, as of a shield, of the presence of the King of the Two Sicilies. Notwithstanding all this, the dispersion of the Neapolitans near Rieti did not take place until after they had resisted the Austrians for a whole day, and severely handled his numerous cavalry, which piqued itself on being invincible. But it will be said, that the reverses of the French in 1792 were very soon followed by the retreat of the Duke of Brunswick, and the victory of Gemappe. To this I reply—If, twelve days after their first check, the French government had thrown itself into the arms of the enemy, if they had delivered up to him their strong places, their fleet, and their whole means of defence, would the French in the sequel have filled the universe with their military glory? Who is there who doubts that if the Royal Family, and the Parliament of Naples, had retired into Calabria, and not abandoned Sicily, the strong places, the fleet, and in short everything, twelve days after the affair of Rieti, who is there who doubts

that the Neapolitans would now be in the possession of immortal glory, and the enjoyment of permanent liberty?

I put this question to such of the French officers as were employed in the war of Naples, in 1799 and 1806, who had only to fight with the lowest classes of the people, acting without direction, and were moreover assisted by the numerous national guards composed of the choicest of the inhabitants. In 1806 the French troops returning from Vienna and Austerlitz, and commanded by Marshal Massena, did not succeed during two years in occupying the extreme part of Calabria, where they suffered considerable losses. I appeal also to the French with whom the Neapolitans fought in Spain, as well as in the North, and particularly at Dantzic; finally, I appeal to the testimony of the Austrians themselves, who combated as allies with the Neapolitans in 1814.

It will perhaps be said that in 1799 and 1815, the troops disbanded themselves instead of defending the kingdom. In 1799 two-thirds of

the army were mere recruits, who had quitted their homes at the end of September 1798, and entered upon active service in November of the same year. The other third, composed of old troops, had never faced an enemy.

Were the Prussians then more fortunate at Jena?

In 1815, Joachim began the campaign with 24,000 infantry, and 3,400 cavalry, viz.—

Three divisions of Infantry - 21,000

Foot Guards - - - 3,000

Horse Lancers - - - 3,000

Hussars of the Guard - 400

Total 27,400

With this army he had to make war with the Holy Alliance, or at least with the Austrians, who passed the Po with 60 or 70,000 men, without taking into account that king Ferdinand was disembarking from Sicily with the promise of a Constitution, and that the English squad-

ron intercepted the communication by sea, and thereby prevented his receiving the succours, which would have been so advantageous to the Neapolitan cause.

All the nations of Europe have had in our own times alternate periods of humiliation and glory, while the unfortunate Italians, particularly the Neapolitans, although they have shed much of their blood in late wars, have experienced, and still experience, nothing but humiliation. It is impossible, however, to deprive the latter of the merit of being the first to rise against the victorious French army, and also the first Italians to seek and obtain a constitutional government. But if they have not maintained either their glory or their liberty, the whole of the Neapolitans ought not to be blamed for it, as I will prove in this Narrative, which I have addressed to his Majesty the King of Naples, and which at least will have the merit of speaking the truth. Lest it should be said that the conspicuous part which I acted in these events has led me to take a mistaken view of

them, the reader will find at the end of this Narrative the necessary documents to satisfy him of the accuracy of my details.

I have farther to request, that he will direct his attention to the *facts* which it contains, and overlook the imperfections of the style, for which I am sensible I have occasion for all his indulgence.

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 indulgence.

To His Majesty,

THE KING OF THE TWO SICILIES.

London, 30th September, 1821.

SIRE,

TO-MORROW will dawn the first of October and is there a single Neapolitan who can contemplate it with indifference? It was on the 1st of October last year, that your Majesty, surrounded by the Representatives of the Nation, the Royal Family, and an immense concourse of your people, swore to maintain the Constitution of Spain, subject to the modifications which should be proposed by the Parliament, and sanctioned by your Majesty. You were saluted by the spectators, with the name of Regenerator of your Country; and the hearts of all were strongly moved at the sight of the tears of tenderness, which were seen flowing from your eyes. After this solemn act I resigned to your Majesty the chief command of the army; I assured you that you would

always find me ready to shed my blood for the constitutional throne, and that I would prefer burying myself under its ruins to surviving its fall ; but the catastrophe of our country came so rapidly that I found no opportunity of making the sacrifice of my life useful to my fellow citizens. I still retain the desire of exhibiting to your Majesty, to Europe, and to posterity, within the bounds of a succinct Narrative: 1st. The conduct of the nation, and my own, before and after the political change. 2nd. What were the real causes of our country being so easily subjugated, notwithstanding the firm determination of the citizens, and the energy which all of them displayed in maintaining the national independence. Finally, I will prove to your Majesty, that if you do not restore the constitution you then swore to, you will neither consult the prosperity of the people, nor the security of the throne.

Sire, Flores Estrada, the present deputy of the Cortes of Spain, wrote from London in 1818, to his king, Ferdinand VII; what misfortunes would not that monarch have spared to Spain, what humiliation and dangers would he not have saved himself, if he had then listened to the language at once respectful and free of that celebrated Remonstrance !

In 1813 the sect of the *Carbonari* was protected and encouraged in the kingdom of Naples either by your Majesty, or by your Ministers in your name, under the promise that on the recovery of your crown, you would give a liberal Constitution to your people. This is an indisputable fact, as the *Carbonari*, declaring themselves the enemies of Joachim, and persecuted by his government, found an asylum and employments in Sicily. And this sect, (or to speak more properly, the nation united in secret societies) declared itself so strongly in 1814, in the Calabrias and the Abruzzi, in favor of a constitutional government, that fifteen Neapolitan generals, with a view to avoid greater misfortunes to the nation, and to Joachim himself, formed the design of obliging him to give a liberal Constitution, by marching upon Naples with twelve thousand men, cantoned in the Marshes. These generals made their intentions known to the English general, Lord William Bentinck, at Genoa; but although they had bound themselves reciprocally to each other, by a double instrument bearing their signatures, they became divided in opinion and never executed their plan. In 1815, your Majesty, on the point of leaving Sicily, and setting sail for

Naples, promised by a public manifesto to give in like manner a Constitution to the provinces on this side the Pharos.* Finally, your Majesty last year, some months before our political change, took an oath to the Spanish Constitution in quality of an Infant of Spain, in order not to lose your right of succession to that crown. And if your ministers pretend that you were obliged by the English to give a constitution to Sicily, how can they do away the spontaneous act by which on quitting that Island you promised a Constitution ; and what will they say to the oath which you took to the Constitution of Spain as Infant of that dynasty ?

No wonder that so many spontaneous acts, and the preservation of the judicial and administrative institutions of the French government, kept alive the disposition, and the hopes, of the Neapolitans for a constitutional government. They believed that your conduct in a manner authorized them to co-operate in all ways in the abolition of absolute power. It was natural for them to persuade themselves that your Majesty wished to fulfil your promises, but that you were diverted from it by your ministers, or by Austrian in-

* See Appendix, No. I.

fluence, which notwithstanding did not succeed in preventing the bordering kingdom of Bavaria from being governed constitutionally. It is certain however that the nation for the first time manifested its impatience at Lecce in 1817. Your ministers in place of giving you wise counsels, persuaded you to send into that province a foreign officer with extraordinary powers, and their triumph was great when they saw for a moment the public spirit checked in that corner of the kingdom. In 1818, your Majesty entrusted me with the command of the provinces of Avellino and Foggia, which had been long desolated by robberies. The military had been several times repulsed by the robbers, and the inhabitants trembled for their lives and properties. The whole of these malefactors were destroyed by the national guards whom I organized, and for the first time these provinces tasted repose and security. These national guards, to the number of ten thousand, dressed in complete uniform at their own expence, excited the admiration of Count Capo d'Istria, the Russian minister, when he passed from Naples to Corfu. In April 1819, I received orders to assemble the militia, for the purpose of being reviewed by His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, a review

which did not take place, because his Majesty on his return from Persano to Salerno learned that the cross road of Avellino was in a bad state. Under Joachim, in spite of the rewards which he lavished, the few soldiers who put on uniforms received them of the government, and never gave proof of zeal for the good of the public, nor of love for their country. From whence then arose this speedy change among the population from which the national guards were formed, and how came they to execute so cheerfully such fatiguing duties? The public good, and the glory of their country, were held up to them, and in their numerous secret meetings they had learned to appreciate that language. It cannot be said that I proposed as officers of the militia, citizens attached to a particular faction, as that was done in concert with the principal authorities in the two provinces ; and as the nominations fell upon such persons as were most distinguished for their easy circumstances and moral character, all of whom belonged to the secret societies, the inference is natural that the whole nation was desirous of a constitutional government. It would be wrong likewise to suppose that these secret societies were organized by me,

as they were equally numerous in all the other provinces of the kingdom. But as I considered a political change to be inevitable, I made every exertion to complete the training of the provincial militia, with which I was intrusted, in order that they might be ready to preserve the country from the disorders which in the beginning are certain to accompany a change of any description. And how was it possible for arbitrary power to maintain itself much longer, when the ministers, the police, the civil and military authorities were perfectly aware of the existence of these numerous societies, and yet dared not make a single arrest! As they were neither strong enough to attempt that, and the judges would not have dared to condemn such of their fellow citizens, as were accused of being *Carbonari*, it may be taken for granted that the nation was determined to groan no longer under the yoke of absolute power.

On the 30th of May last year, the Liberals of Salerno, a city regarded as the centre of the liberal societies of the kingdom, sent me a nomination to be their captain general, with several printed proclamations recommending a spontaneous movement in all the provinces, of which they urged me to take the direction. I ordered

the chief of my staff to commit all these papers to the flames, and give for answer to the Liberals of Salerno, that I had the good of our country as much at heart as they had, that I was desirous of contributing to the national prosperity, abstracted from all feelings of self interest, but that an act of that importance must be well considered, and that they must moderate their zeal. The Salernitans, knowing that I could entirely control the inhabitants of the military division confided to me, abstained from any movement.

During this period I became every day more and more convinced of the importance of my position, of the duties attached to my rank, and to the quality of a citizen, which ought never to be lost sight of. I had several times intended to lay before your Majesty the wishes of the whole nation, but you were inaccessible, and my statements would have been at least useless. I made an attempt, not without considerable risk, to influence the minister Medici, who hearing me speak in praise of the national guard, said to me, "But if they were the first to demand the Constitution?" to which I replied, "Certainly, they desire the Constitution, and how should they be the only ones not to desire what all their countrymen are anxious

for? If the king was to grant it, or if the nation declared itself more openly, the militia would contribute greatly to it, provided the king were respected, and disorder avoided." The minister closed the conversation by these words, "General, this speech might turn into action, if you or I were the king."

A few days after this evasive answer of the minister, the Liberals began to manifest uneasiness in Calabria and at Salerno; arrests were ordered in those provinces, and it was no longer in my power to prevent partial movements, the consequences of which might be fatal, as the least evil that could arise therefrom would be to see the plan of the ministry realized of recalling the Austrian troops.

About the 20th of June, I was made acquainted with the intentions of your Majesty, to appoint me to the command of the Calabrias. I saw clearly that if I removed from Avellino, partial revolts would break out at different points, which for want of proper direction might plunge the kingdom into anarchy. From that moment, firm in the resolution to devote myself at all hazards to the good of the nation, and to do something useful to our country, I determined on the 25th of June, to unite ten

thousand men of the third military division, who without disturbing the public tranquillity, and by means of deputies, should acquaint your Majesty with the truths, which your ministers had not dared to disclose, and beseech you to grant the promised Constitution. A circumstance which is now well known throughout the kingdom, obliged me to delay the execution of my plan, until the first of the following month. But on the morning of the 2d of July, a squadron of the regiment of Bourbon, which had come to Naples for three or four days, followed by some citizens of Nola, sallied forth, proceeding by the road of Monteforte, towards my head quarters at Avellino, proclaiming the Constitutional monarchy on their way. Some days before this event, I had dispatched a cavalry officer to this corps, with a view to prevent any partial movement as more injurious than useful; this precaution however proved ineffectual. But was it possible for one hundred and twenty cavalry to overturn the system of absolute power which had lasted for ages? No, Sire!

As it happened, the Constitution was proclaimed at Foggia before it had been at Avellino; and it was also proclaimed in all the provinces, before orders to that effect arrived from the

capital. And precisely on the very same day, the 2nd of July, I wrote from Naples to the Marechal de Camp Colonna,* and to the chief officer of my staff, ordering them to assemble the militia; I could not however before the 5th. set out for my head quarters at Avellino, with two regiments of cavalry. During my absence the chief of my staff had displayed a great deal of energy and resolution. The troops which came to join me at Avellino, were not the only ones to declare in favor of a Constitutional monarchy, as the others were equally desirous of coming to Monteforte; and my brother General Florestan Pepe, who was summoned to Nola by your Majesty, restrained them entirely by the assurance that they were considered as part of the Constitutional army, since your Majesty had in your proclamation promised the Spanish Constitution. It is a great mistake to believe, or to wish to make it be believed, that the political change at Naples was a *military revolution*, for allowing the propriety of applying the term revolution to such a movement, it must be admitted to have been national, as the enthusiasm of a young sub-lieutenant only led his troop to give the signal of a movement in which every Neapolitan was pre-

* See Appendix, No. II.

pared to join. The army participated the wishes of the nation, as must ever be the case, in spite of all the means of caressing the troops which an absolute government has at command, when a people are perfectly ripe for liberty?*

Sire ! if a Constitutional government was not the unanimous wish of the nation, how could it have been established without shedding a drop of blood? In 1799, a victorious army came to Naples and proclaimed a republic ; the first persons in the state adhered to it, and yet the kingdom was inundated with blood, and the royalists beat the republicans, although the latter were supported by foreign troops. And why did this happen? Because the people did not wish to have a republic, and from that moment in speaking of the republicans we may apply to them the name of faction. When, therefore, in place of the general consent, a faction has obtained the ascendancy among a people, it requires to be supported either by foreign troops or external influence. In the contrary supposition the minority cannot rule over the majority, and the faction must give way to the general feeling. In 1799, a Cardinal conducted some indisciplined masses to the capital ; and what scenes of

* See Appendix, No. III.

horror and wickedness did they not commit? In the present case however twenty thousand citizens of all classes, animated by the love of their country, followed the constitutional army to Naples, and excited general admiration by their exemplary conduct, and the disinterestedness they shewed in refusing the rewards offered them by the government. These are the causes of the Neapolitans appearing in 1820 so united, zealous, and prepared for a representative government; and was it possible for the army which declared itself in favor of the new system, to have any other motive than the public good? Your Majesty will recollect that all the officers actually, and not nominally, refused every kind of reward, either in money, decorations, or rank. Colonel Celeutari, of the Queen's regiment of cavalry, a distinguished officer, who followed me to Avellino, had no promotion, although Colonel Labrano, who had marched against the national guards of Solofra, was named *Maréchal de Camp*. What can prove more strongly, Sire, that they had no other object in view than the public good? And as I am attacked with so much bitterness in the ministerial journals, to which I have hitherto disdained to reply, your Majesty will allow me to observe, notwithstanding the repugnance I feel to speak

of myself, that it was attachment to my country alone which guided all my actions. I still preserve the letter with which I was honored from his Royal Highness the Duke of Calabria, which proves that so far from being ambitious of the rank of Captain general, I desired its abolition, as being incompatible with the Constitutional government.* And if I had been actuated by motives of paltry ambition, had I not much greater means of gratifying it under an absolute government? Some days before the political change, it was proposed to me, on the part of your Majesty, to take the command of the Calabrias, retaining still that of Avellino and Foggia. The ministers Medici and Tommasi could not treat me in a more flattering manner than they did ; and I was perfectly acquainted with the unhappy fate of all those who, from feelings of patriotism, had endeavoured to liberate their fellow citizens from the yoke of absolute power which degrades the human race. But I have at all times, Sire! idolized my country, and although at three different periods, disastrous circumstances have led Europe unjustly to appreciate us by the event, I have never for a moment felt otherwise than proud of the

* See Appendix, No. IV.

name of Neapolitan. Citizens ought to be like pious children towards their helpless parents, and cherish their country so much the more as she is unfortunate. The love of country is, of all the passions I have experienced, the most delightful and most constant. What nobleness, what grandeur, does not that passion acquire in the heart of a king! But in the midst of the enthusiasm and elevation produced by the political change, did the cry of *Long live the King, and Royal Family!* ever cease? The friends, the brothers, the wives and fathers, of the numerous victims of 1799, whom the faith of a sacred capitulation could not save from the axe of the executioner, were present when I led the constitutional army to Naples. And yet no one recalled his own sorrows, or reproached the government for the loss of his children, and all contributed to increase the joy of that memorable day.

When His Royal Highness the Duke of Calabria did me the honor of presenting me to your Majesty, he said to you, as if to excuse me, that I had been ignorant of what was going on up to the 9th of July, and that I had left my head-quarters from the fear of being arrested; but I took occasion to tell your Majesty frankly that I had been long watching over the national

security, on which that of your dynasty depended. Your Majesty's reply was, "General, I hope you will always conduct yourself as honorably;" and I assured you that I would shed my blood under all circumstances for the constitutional monarch.

The nation saw with pain that your Majesty absented yourself from the theatres, and from the festival of Piedigrotta; and yet, without the escort of a single soldier, a greater and stronger degree of respect was shown towards you, than in the time of absolute government. The press was free, but in so many journals, and in such a prodigious quantity of ephemeral productions, did there ever appear a page in which there was the slightest want of that respect which citizens owe to their king? But courtiers are always ready to dispute what is evident, and several foreign ministers reported to their courts that the kingdom was groaning under anarchy.* The French Ambassador, the Duke de Narbonne, speaking to me in the name of his government, declared to me that France would not interfere in the affairs of Naples, excepting in the event of our not paying proper respect to the Royal Family. To this I replied, that, as commander in

* See Appendix, No. V.

chief, I would perish sooner than allow any such disorders, but that I took no particular credit to myself for a sentiment which was common to the whole nation,—that of love and attachment to a king who had become its regenerator.

These, Sire, are the true and leading circumstances which accompanied the political change, which the ministerial league of Europe wishes to have considered as a movement of anarchy.

I will now demonstrate to your Majesty that not only was the nation unanimous in its wish for the abolition of absolute power, but that to preserve its liberties it displayed the greatest energy, and was disposed to make every sacrifice; and I will explain how it happened notwithstanding, that in a few days it was subjugated by a foreign enemy, which would have found its grave in our country, had the national impetus been fairly directed.

On my entry into Naples with the constitutional army, I saw clearly that in order to preserve an imposing attitude, and that all might concur in the object of supporting our national independence, it was desirable to establish a military dictatorship, which should be laid down, when the nation, out of danger, and covered with glory, should be more firmly

bound to your dynasty. But neither I, nor any other of the generals, could pretend to be invested with such a power, for in order to exercise it effectually, it was necessary either to have it conferred by the national representation, which then did not exist; or it required a soldier of distinguished military reputation, at the head of an army, accustomed to victory and obedience. I preserved the chief command of the army, without having the organizing and administrative part of it, until the period of the assembling of the national representatives; and I relied upon the energy of the provisional junta and of the ministry. This system was more consonant with the respect due to the throne, and with the moderation of European nations, who wished for a well regulated liberty. The junta and the ministry, by an inconceivable fatality, never fully impressed themselves with the necessity of the nation occupying itself wholly with the means of defence. Thus they neglected to purchase muskets which we were in want of; they did not immediately send to England, to Spain, and to Russia, ambassadors extraordinary, devoted to the national cause; they did not organize the army, and the national guards were almost forgotten. Finally they did not hasten the expedi-

tion to Sicily, which had become indispensable to put down the state of anarchy at Palermo.* Upon my repeated instances, as was represented by the junta of government to the parliament, and after a delay of nearly three months! the military on furlough were recalled to their colours, the organization of the army was decreed, and the expedition to Sicily was executed. In order to effect the speedy organization of the army, I collected the corps of every description between Gaeta and Castellamare. The provinces of the kingdom thus remained without troops, and that circumstance, which could never happen under an absolute government, produced not the slightest inconvenience under the constitutional government. The veterans, that is to say the military on furlough, in place of being forcibly dragged, as had been usual, to their banners, rushed spontaneously to the defence of their country, abandoning their wives and child-

* The expedition to Sicily was necessary, not for the purpose of subduing the Sicilians or preventing them from creating a parliament separate from that of Naples, but to lend them a strong arm in order to put down the anarchy of the city of Palermo, the continuance of which threw discredit on our political change in the eyes of foreign nations. And how great should we not appear in the eyes of Europe, where we had exhibited vigor and disinterestedness, bravery and moderation!

ren. The citizens rivalled each other in enrolling themselves in the militia and in the legions. Finally, six thousand men without artillery, and absolutely without a change of flints to their muskets, put a period to the anarchy of Palermo, although the walls of that city were defended by forty thousand men of the levies en masse, and by four hundred pieces of cannon ; and this instance leads me to observe to your Majesty that under the absolute government it could never succeed in destroying the single band of Vardarelli.* Was it possible for the nation to exhibit more good will, or greater energy ?

In this state of things, on the 1st of October, I resigned the command in chief into the hands of your Majesty, and Europe is too well acquainted with the transactions of that memorable day, which the Neapolitans will never forget.†

The national parliament, full of patriotism, but acting as if in doubt of the policy of the Austrian cabinet, and trusting more to the justice of their

* The band of Vardarelli was composed of about thirty robbers on horseback ; and the government after failing in all its attempts to destroy it, was at last actually obliged to treat with it. The constitutional government in a few days subdued all the revolted cities of Sicily. Which of the two governments had the greatest strength ?

† See Appendix, Nos. VI. VII. VIII.

cause than to the strength of the nation, instead of looking for the real means of directing its enthusiasm, abandoned everything connected with the war department to the executive power. I passed the whole month of October without employment, and I felt pleased at seeing it thus proved indisputably that the nation was directed by the government, and by the love of their country which animated all the citizens, and not by a general whom some wished to represent as the head of a predominant faction. But previously to this, I had made several applications to be sent in a diplomatic capacity to Spain, with the permission of returning at the first appearance of war. I had taken that step with the hope that my absence would put an end to those petty jealousies which are sure to be excited in such cases. But his Royal Highness the Duke of Calabria in his letter of the 30th September, informed me that he could not then comply with my request.* In other respects I felt no apprehension for the fate of my country, when I recollected that the lower classes alone, without any fortresses, without a government or chiefs to direct them, had given so much trouble to a French army of sixty thousand

* See Appendix, No. IX.

men, commanded by Marshal Massena. I have always thought, and still think, if the fortresses had been properly garrisoned and provisioned, and the Castle of St. Angelo put into a state to hold out two or three months, and if the Royal Family and the parliament had retired into Calabria, that with the possession of the sea, and united to Sicily, we might have destroyed the enemy, even if we had had no army.

The Austrians will know what the kingdom of Naples is, when a favorable opportunity occurs.

During the whole of the month of October, the government, instead of forwarding the preparations for defence, made a retrograde step by disgusting the Sicilians.* If a parliament had been granted to them, separate from that of Naples, we should, instead of keeping up a garrison in that island, have had fifteen thousand Sicilians to reinforce our army; and in case of reverses, Sicily and Calabria would have been impregnable to the Austrians.†

On the 1st of November, I was absolutely forced to take the inspection of the national guards, of whom, in a very short time more

* See Appendix, No. X.

† See Appendix, No. XI.

than one hundred and twenty thousand were organized ; half of these were clothed at their own expence, without including the horse and foot guard of safety at Naples, as fine a body of men as were ever seen in any other capital of Europe. The citizens of whom it was composed, expended at least five millions of francs in forty days, and kept the most perfect order in the capital, without the assistance of the military. These are facts, Sire, the truth of which the most interested partizans of despotism cannot deny. But if one half of these national guards were unprovided with proper muskets, which might have been had on credit from England ; if a portion of the battalions of militia and legionaries were never assembled for the purpose of acquiring discipline and instruction, is that the fault of the nation, or of those who governed it? If the parliament, although always actuated by the best motives, committed the error of disgusting the Sicilians,* ought the nation to be blamed for that? and ought similar faults, and the negligence of the government, to lead to the conclusion that the nation was not disposed to make every sacrifice to preserve its independence?

* See Appendix, No. XII.

At last, however, came the 7th of December, the day when the foreign ministers and the Neapolitan ministry set every engine at work to plunge the nation into anarchy, but in vain, for it was too much attached to good order.* They made you send to the parliament the message which is so well known, and while the answer was preparing, they distributed manifestoes in the provinces and in the capital. Several persons have pronounced their opinion of the contents of this message† without paying attention to the circumstance, that by virtue of royal instructions, published in the month of July preceding, the deputies to the parliament were not authorized by their constituents to change the basis of the Spanish Constitution. Your Majesty had so decreed it, in order that the parliament should not go beyond the Constitution that had been sworn to. And even if this disposition had not existed, the ministry ought to have treated with the national representation, and not have given orders to publish in your

* The intrigues and means of seduction which were made use of on the 7th of December, were equally disgraceful to the seducers and the seduced, but a day will come when a complete exposure will be made of the manœuvres practised on that day.

† See Appendix, Nos. XIII. and XIV.

name the articles of a new Constitution, without having communicated them to the parliament, and at the same time keeping the royal guard under arms, with their artillery ready to fire. Besides what security could the nation have had from foreign invasion, even if those articles had been accepted? Would it have been in the oaths of Sovereigns? The Neapolitans are now groaning under slavery, by the aid of a foreign army, and not by the voices of their representatives. And if there were some men who at that time put faith in the articles contained in the message, are they not now fully convinced that their only object was to destroy our independence by negociation? It will be replied that at that time the nation would not accept them, and that subsequently it offered resistance to the Austrian army. But the congress at Laybach, as well as your Majesty, declared that the proposed arrangements were only opposed by a few obstinate and rebellious persons. And why should the whole nation be now deprived of its liberties for the madness of a guilty few, who are the greatest part of them in prison? And if I, who led the army to fight against the invaders, am not there also, I promise your Majesty in the face of

Europe, to come and deliver myself up to your ministers, or even to the enemy, ready to sacrifice my life, if, regarding the nation as innocent, a liberal Constitution is granted to her. This she will obtain sooner or later by her own energy, if she does not obtain it of your Majesty or the Austrian policy, although it may cost a great deal of blood and sacrifices. But what sacrifices ought not man to submit to, in order to get rid of the yoke of despotism? I appeal to the English for a reply.

On the 7th of December the royal guards made their intentions sufficiently evident. As this body was commanded by officers, who during the reign of Joachim had lived in the garrisons of Sicily, loaded with privileges incompatible with a constitutional government, it is inconceivable how the parliament could be so blindly confident as not to disband such a corps. This, Sire, arose solely from the deference which the deputies preserved for your Majesty,—for the Nestor of the Sovereigns of Europe. The parliament cannot be accused of weakness, for the message, by which the existing Constitution was sought to be overturned, was resented with that dignity which became the representatives of a free nation. Your Majesty

demanded permission to set out for Laybach, and the parliament always full of excessive confidence, granted it, and communicated its assent by the medium of a deputation which you received in the presence-chamber. Your Majesty proposed to repair to the Congress, with the sole view of obtaining a recognition by your allies, of the Constitution to which you had sworn; and the deputy Borelli, who was the spokesman on the occasion, concluded an eloquent harangue by invoking the Sovereign of the Universe, the avenger of perjury, to be the guarantee of the oaths of your Majesty, of you who are in a certain degree one of his representatives upon earth. Sire! is it possible that our contemporaries and future generations should ever believe that your Majesty, in presence of that God from whom it is impossible to conceal our most secret thoughts, should entertain at that very moment the idea of enslaving our beautiful country by means of a foreign army; of making the Neapolitans pay the penalty of their moderation, and of their having looked upon you as an affectionate father? Had your Majesty then forgotten that you were yourself a Neapolitan? and to avoid sharing a portion of your power with the nation, was it in your contemplation

to abandon the whole of it to an Austrian general?

In the provinces however, as well as in the capital, the inhabitants became impatient of the delay exhibited in the preparations of defence. The Abruzzians seeing their frontiers entirely stripped of military, and the materials of war, were on the point of rising en masse, under the impression of being betrayed by the government. I went there by order of the Regent, and it is impossible to describe the enthusiasm that reigned in those provinces. Men and women of all ranks came to meet me, in the midst of the snow, recommending to me the defence of the national liberties. I caused the letter of the deputy Poerio to be read to them, in which he assured me that your Majesty, even in Tuscany, continued to be animated by sentiments worthy of a descendant of St. Louis. The Abruzzians blessed your name with a joy divested of the least suspicion. Oh, Sire! why were you not then in the midst of these good people? I visited in these provinces the societies which had ceased to be secret. The principal landed proprietors, the most respectable inhabitants, the ministers of religion, and the most wealthy farmers and artisans,

were all members of the so much calumniated society of Carbonari.* I heard some enthusiastic

* The society of *Carbonari* has been depicted in frightful colours, but how could it be otherwise by the mercenary slaves of absolute power? Previous to its existence in the kingdom of Naples, every change and popular movement was sure to be followed by pillage and crimes. After its introduction among us, the people became prudent and moral. If any wretch belonging to this society took part in the assassination of Giampetro, that would only prove that in societies actuated by the strictest morality, wicked men may contrive to introduce themselves. The society of Freemasons, of which the Carbonari is only a branch, has frequently been under the disagreeable necessity of expelling from its body men whose infamous conduct has proved them unworthy to belong to it. Thanks to the society of Carbonari, during the eight months of the constitutional government we had ceased to hear of crimes and malefactors. The assassination of Giampetro made so much noise solely because it was the only instance of the kind during that period, and if the press were now free, how many crimes would be brought to light! Under the constitutional government the provinces were without troops, and enjoyed the most perfect tranquility, without a single arbitrary arrest. At present in the kingdom of Naples the generals command with the *Alter ego*, like the Pachas in Turkey. To return to the society of Carbonari, and to shut the mouths of those who would stigmatize it as impious, it should be recollected that it was introduced by an absolute government, who propagated it in our kingdom as long as the king, who was then in Sicily, had occasion for it. Far from excommunicating the Carbonari, the church at that time caused it to be preached

youths at these meetings deliver discourses more full of pure morality, wisdom, and utility to mankind than ever proceeded from the lips of the Jesuits whom your ministers have restored. Thanks to the Carbonari, there was observable in the Abruzzi a greater respect to property than had ever been known at any former period, and crimes were not merely diminished, but had entirely ceased. This I could not myself at first believe, but the fact was confirmed to me by the attorney general of these provinces, and your Majesty cannot be supposed to be ignorant of a circumstance so important.

Towards the end of January I returned to Naples, and to my extreme regret found that not a single musket had arrived from abroad. No answer had even been given to a letter of Colonel Macirone from London, who desiring to return to the Neapolitan service, made an offer of sending a quantity of arms and ammunition, for which the government might pay at a more convenient time. I solicited the assembling of some battalions of the national guards, for the purpose of instructing and disciplining

by the monks and priests, that the exhibiting the signs of a Carbonaro was sufficient to make St. Peter open the gates of Paradise!

them, but I could not obtain permission to do so, under the pretence of a want of money. Finally they had not even taken care to summon General Wilson, who had offered his services with a considerable force.*

During these conjunctures your Majesty's first letter spoke of the amusement you had found in the chase, and of the superiority of your dogs over those of the Emperor Alexander.† While the nation was amused in this manner, the Austrian army had time to concentrate itself on the left bank of the Po, in order to fall upon me by forced marches. At the moment the enemy was in a situation to commence hostilities, your Majesty's fatal letter arrived, in which the invasion of the country by a foreign enemy was announced, even though it consented to return under the absolute government. This was a moment, Sire, when the Neapolitan nation deserved to be regarded with attention by your Majesty, and by all Europe. Formerly a nation

* When the Austrians had arrived upon the frontiers, a commission was dispatched to Sir Robert Wilson, of Lieutenant General in the Neapolitan service, which that distinguished officer, so well known for his liberal ideas, did not receive until every thing was terminated at Naples.

† I regret not having preserved a copy of this letter, so as to be able to include it in the documents in the Appendix.

was considered to be ripe for freedom, when it could acquire it without foreign assistance ; but now it must also maintain it against disciplined armies. Well! the nation was prepared to do so. I will not allow myself the least exaggeration, and I appeal to his Royal Highness the Duke of Calabria, for the truth of the fact, that when your Majesty's letter was published, fêtes and other demonstrations of joy, were exhibited in all the chief provincial towns. It was the general observation, " We have given proofs of every kind of moderation in order to avoid a war ; now that it is become unavoidable, we will meet it with cheerfulness." The persons most attached to your Majesty repeated publicly that you could not have taken any step more contrary to your assumed interests, or better calculated to unite the hearts of the Neapolitans, in the defence of the national independence.

But in what state of defence did your letter find the nation ? The Austrians passed through Bologna on the 8th of February,* and on the 15th I had not yet received my appointment to the chief command of the second corps of the army in the Abruzzi, nor my brother that of chief of the general staff. Every thing else

* See Appendix, No. XV.

was of a piece with this ; no disposition for war—no plan of defence—and no military *espionage* organized. There were no magazines of provisions in the Abruzzi, no means of conveyance, no hospitals, no quarter master general, no money in the army chests, and not even a paymaster general. The magazines of shoes and cloaks, promised to the militia, did not exist any more than those of fire arms. The battalions of militia had not yet received orders to march, so that it was impossible for any of them to reach the frontiers of the Abruzzi before the enemy. For the same reason nearly half of the national battalions only learned on their march that there was no longer a constitutional government, nor rallying point, as it is a march of thirty or forty days from the Calabrias and Apulia to the frontiers. Besides, could the militia, collected for the first time, and with so much precipitation, deserve the name of battalions? The “three hundred” Abruzzians who offered themselves as rivals of the soldiers of Leonidas, and the “sacred battalion,” destined for the corps which I commanded, were never organized. Was it then the fault of the nation, if it was so badly directed, and taken by surprise in the manner it was? Were not the taxes

punctually paid, good order maintained every where without *gendarmes*, and did not sixty national battalions march immediately in obedience to a mere telegraphic order? And does not their rapid march, in the midst of so much confusion, prove beyond dispute the national order and unanimity?

The parliament seeing at last, but too late, the state of things, displayed a great deal of energy, and made use of every effort to save the country, but without losing its primitive confidence. We must seek for the true causes of our dishonour, and our servitude, in the parliament not conferring an absolute military command on some one officer, and in its not retiring in proper time into Calabria with the Royal Family. The state in which the Austrians surprised us proved sufficiently that the chances of the war were likely to be multiplied and difficult. Besides, notwithstanding the firmly declared resolution of the nation, there were not wanting weak

* The national guards had no leather knapsacks. I was promised linen ones, and did not even get them, so that the militia and national guards had no means of carrying a shirt, a pair of shoes, or a loaf of bread. The greatest part of these battalions had no cartouch boxes, so that they had not even the means of preserving their cartouches, or securing them against wet or damp, to prevent them from becoming useless.

or perfidious men who represented the Russians as upon the Po, and the English and French fleets as ready to take part against us. In the latter supposition we should have lost the great strategical resource which an open sea would have afforded us. Again how could our worthy deputies, deceiving themselves at the critical moment, ever think that the Regent, without the least experience in war, in a state of health which did not permit him to follow up his generous intentions of taking the personal command of the army, and threatened at the same time by almost all the powers of Europe, would be able to wage an obstinate war against a father, whose name alone had been always sufficient to annihilate his intentions, and to whom, moreover, he had never dissembled his ideas of paying the blindest filial obedience? The parliament said that the supreme command of the army was entrusted by the constitution to the king and the regent; but in extreme cases, all means are allowable which can save the country. Besides the constitution had never contemplated the fatal case where the son was to make war against the father.

At last, on the 16th of February,* I was ap-

* See Appendix, No. XVI.

pointed commander in chief of the second corps of the army, my brother nominated chief of the general staff, and the militia received orders to march. On the 20th, I reached my head quarters at Aquila, and from my anxiety not to lose a single day, was very nearly perishing among the snows in the neighbourhood of the Gran Sasso d'Italia, near Tottea. On the same day I received a report that the enemy was establishing himself on the frontiers. The Chevalier d'Onis, the Spanish Ambassador,—whose honor and integrity ought to be admired by your Majesty, and will be long remembered by the grateful Neapolitans, and by all who are attached to their duties and to constitutional principles—wrote to me on the 27th of February, “General, the Austrians are about to direct all their forces against you, for they think that when your army is destroyed, they will have nothing more to do.” I had only eight battalions of regular troops, and two hundred cavalry to guard a line of one hundred and fifty miles in extent, and was ignorant on what side the enemy would advance. I was in want of provisions, and of the means of conveying them to the different positions. There were no magazines prepared for the battalions of militia whom

* See Appendix, No. XVII.

I expected within a few days. I wrote to the ministry in the most pressing terms, but was it a moment to be *writing*, when the Austrians were directing their whole forces against me, as if sure of their prey? They were perfectly apprized of my critical position, and foresaw, or perhaps knew, that I should receive no assistance. In this state of things I received my instructions signed by the Regent; * I was there allowed perfect liberty to enter into Romagna. I was directed to preserve the Abruzzi at all hazards, and was assured, that in the event of the enemy directing his whole force against me, I should be assisted by the first corps of the army commanded by General Carascosa, either by manœuvring or by some detachments of troops. I expected therefore every moment to hear that the first corps had sent me a division of troops of the line, and had menaced the enemy on the side of Liri. I began, however, to be joined by some battalions of militia, collected in haste, fatigued by their march, unprovided with cloaks, badly fed for the want of provisions, and armed with fowling pieces without bayonets, the greater part of which were so completely useless for service, that I endeavoured to supply their deficiency by means of pikes hastily

* See Appendix, No. XVIII. and XIX.

~~made~~, rather for the moral effect, than any real ~~utility~~. To crown all, these raw battalions were ~~actually~~ obliged to bivouac in the midst of the ~~snow~~.

It was only on the 3rd of March that a councillor of state repaired to my head-quarters, with orders to furnish the army with provisions, but without money to pay for them. The quarter-master general and pay-master general followed with some thousand ducats. In the mean time I received information that the whole of the Austrian forces were disposed in such a way round Rieti, that they could at any moment ~~smack~~ me on several points. On our side, I collected in the environs of Civita Ducale the whole of my disposeable force, amounting to ten thousand men, who were very irregularly supplied with provisions. The Maréchal de camp Russo wrote to me from the advanced posts, for three days in succession, that he expected every instant to be attacked by the Austrians: several spies, in whom I had reason to confide, dispelled doubts I might have had of the intentions of the enemy. They were busy circulating in the ~~country~~ the proclamations of your Majesty and General Frimont, by means of the Intendant Aquila, who had fled from his residence for

the purpose of serving them as a guide in their invasion. In this state of things I passed the 5th of March at Antrodoco with my staff, and the 6th at Civita Ducale, where I received two reports, one from Colonel Mantua de Tagliacozzo, announcing to me the disbanding of nearly a whole battalion of militia from Campobasso, and the other from Colonel Pisa (an officer who had always greatly distinguished himself while on active service, and whose patriotism has made him an object of persecution) communicating the news of the disbanding of two militia battalions from Teramo, which were under his orders at Arquate, and had been intended to be employed as partizan troops at Visso and Seravalle. These disbandings were attributed to the irregularity with which the battalions had been assembled for want of time, to the rapid passage which these young men had made from the bosom of their families to a state of fatigue and privations, and finally to the treachery of the persons who had distributed the Austrian proclamations.* *In fact Colonel Pisa pointed out to me two adjutants as employed by persons of high rank to effect a dispersion.* It was not a difficult thing to produce dis-

* See Appendix, Nos. XX. and XXI.

couragement among the militia, by persuading them that almost all the powers of Europe were united for our destruction.

Finally on the same day (the 6th) Colonel Cianiulli, dispatched by the Regent and the minister at war, arrived at my head quarters ; but in place of bringing me intelligence of the approach of reinforcements, he communicated to me the plan of an entrenched camp at Aquila with artillery, which artillery was only to leave Naples at the time when the enemy was preparing to attack and surround me, on the side of Tagliacozzo and Leonessa, a point too weak to be defended by a few militia.

If I remained two days longer inactive, the destruction of my corps appeared to me inevitable ; first, because we should have seen a renewal of the examples of disbanding, fomented by traitors in the other battalions ; second, because the enemy would have turned the positions of Antrodoco, and the above mentioned points of Tagliacozzo and Leonessa, after having beat with his strong columns, the feeble forces which I had been able to leave there. A retreat at first was contrary to my instructions, and would have produced the same discouragement in young troops, as if they had been

beaten. For these reasons I determined to make a *reconnoissance*, which, although it might lead me into an engagement, could not be attended with disadvantage, considering the excellence of the positions which favoured us. On the other hand the system of defensive fighting was that which best suited my situation, and I was desirous of showing the militia that with the advantage of ground they might measure their strength with the best Austrian troops. On the morning of the 7th I attacked the enemy near Rieti, a town about three miles distant from Civita Ducale, with a force consisting of three thousand regular troops, and seven thousand militia; two thousand more troops, principally militia, had orders to advance from my right to Piedi Lugo, ten miles distant from Rieti, to alarm the Austrians, and keep them in indecision.

Sire, It is not necessary for me to enter into details, but it is impossible to deny that the Neapolitans supported for seven hours a very brisk fire, and that the enemy's cavalry failed in all the charges which it attempted to make on the 12th regiment formed in square masses, on the third light infantry, and on the militia of the Capitanata. The two hundred cavalry of the

king's regiment whom I had partly armed with lances stood their ground admirably. The enemy's loss, particularly in cavalry, of which the hospitals at Rieti can furnish the best proofs, and the circumstance that not one of our men received a sabre wound, afford the strongest confirmation to your Majesty of the truth of my statement, and also prove that we fought in very advantageous positions. After a contest of seven hours, the enemy, having collected a considerable force in the plain, prepared to force the right of my position. Having obtained both my objects, of reconnoiting the enemy, and accustoming my troops to fight with advantage, (and up to that moment the intrepidity of both regulars and militia had in general left me little to complain of in their conduct)*, I made my dispositions for retreat, in order to take up much stronger positions than the first, and at a distance of not more than a mile and a half from them. The first line commenced its movement in the best order, and was never forced; but the militia who were in the second line, being un-

* I have been assured that in the report which General Frimont addressed to the Aulic council at Vienna, he developed all the circumstances of the action of Rieti, and spoke of them in very different terms from what were published in the newspapers

accustomed to rally, or to preserve their ranks, fell into the greatest confusion, and getting scattered about on the heights, no longer listened to their officers. A part of the first line followed the example of the second ; but there still remained a sufficient number of brave soldiers, who supported the retrograde movement with the greatest intrepidity, and prevented the enemy from continuing his march towards Civita Ducale. Night came on, and I still retained the hope that both troops and militia, recovering from their momentary panic, would rally at Antrodoco. In that case the enemy would not even have been aware of the disbanding, and on the following day, with the same force and the additional militia whom I expected, I should have manœuvred in such a way, as to dispute with the Austrians the complete possession of the Abruzzi.

Several persons, Sire, have blamed me for attacking the Austrians, or rather for having quitted the passes of Antrodoco to reconnoitre them. In a question of this kind we must not look to the opinions of the multitude, but to those of experienced officers : and I know that at Paris several distinguished generals, including some of the marshals of France, were all of opinion that I could not dispense

with reconnoitring the enemy : and that commanding young troops and national guards, brought together for the first time, it was necessary to defend the Abruzzi, not by waiting steadily to be attacked by disciplined troops, but by repeated engagements without losing the advantage of position.* And if I had been able to announce to the nation the details of the 7th

* It was very generally reported in the capital and in the provinces that my orders were, not to attack the Austrians, who if they had not received provocation, would not have marched against us. These reports were spread on purpose to make it be believed, that I was the author of all the calamities which the nation would suffer from the war, and thereby draw upon me the hatred of my fellow citizens, and deprive me of the possibility of serving them as a rallying point for the defence of the country. How could it ever be supposed, that the Austrians, who had declared their intention of entering the kingdom, even if the constitutional government were abolished, and had assembled the whole of their forces in the neighbourhood of Rieti would have suspended hostilities if I had not attacked them? They only remained inactive for a few days at Rieti, waiting the effect of the publication of the threats and promises of the King, and General Frimont, in order to effect by such means of seduction the disbanding of my corps, and to get information of my movements by their spies. The Intendant of Aquila, had been several months with the Austrians, directed their *espionage* with a great deal of talent. Finally, if it suited the enemy to gain time, by a parity of reasoning it did not suit me to grant it him. The circumstances which took place in Piedmont a few days after, were quite

of March, divested of the disbanding, what a powerful effect it would have had upon the spirit of the people, of the army, and of the national guards!

When I arrived myself at Antrodoco in the evening, I saw that it was impossible to judge of the effects of the disbanding until the following morning. But during the night, at the different *bivouacs*, a continual fire of musketry was traitorously kept up on purpose to disperse the militia soldiers, who thus believing themselves pursued by the Austrians, continued to disband without waiting for the appearance of day. This perfidious act was the work of some base wretches, who had sold themselves to the enemy. At the dawn of day the disbanding was so complete, that it was with the greatest difficulty a few hundred men could be collected at Antrodoco, under the orders of a general.

I repaired immediately to Aquila, with a view to determine what plan to adopt; but the unlooked for by me; and could not be reckoned upon; as in the month of September preceding, having in concert with the Junta of the government, sent colonel Pisa for the purpose of sounding the dispositions of that people and their government towards the Austrians, he was assured by persons of consequence that the Piedmontese were indisposed from making any movement in our favor.

disbanded soldiers and militia, finding that the inhabitants wished to arrest them, or even to put them to death, for abandoning their colours, and seeking for impunity in the number of their accomplices, spread the report everywhere that I was either killed or taken prisoner; that several thousand of our troops had been cut in pieces by the enemy's cavalry, and several other distracting reports, which although false, reached the capital, where they added that I had engaged with my militia in the plain. These reports, however absurd, had the effect of completing the disbanding of the national battalions, which were on their march to join me.

On the 9th, the enemy made his appearance, with an imposing force, at Antrodoco and Leonessa. There only remained a few hundred men for the defence of these points, who fought with courage, and only yielded to superior numbers, in which their merit was greater, as the pass of Antrodoco was turned on the side of Capradosso, and that of Leonessa is not very difficult. I was obliged in consequence to quit Aquila on the morning of the 10th, and finding myself wholly unable to stop the disbanding, I gave orders to all the generals to make a timely retreat, in order not to be cut off with the small detachments

which they had preserved. The officers of all the national battalions united in offering to serve as private soldiers ; but I gave them orders to return to their respective districts, and reorganize, in eight days, their battalions by their own selection, and summoned them to meet me between Salerno and Avellino. I then issued a proclamation in these words: "National Guards, you have behaved with extraordinary patriotism, you have braved the inclemency of the weather, and every other privation ; you have made extremely fatiguing marches, you have clothed yourselves at your own expence, and you have met without shrinking the best troops of the enemy. Can a momentary panic, or the treachery of some satellites of despotism, make you forget a cause so noble and advantageous, for which you have made so many voluntary sacrifices ? Monteforte will be our rallying point of meeting, and your officers will conduct you to that spot, thereby consecrated to posterity. For the first time you have done sufficient ; all the good you have effected is attributable to your own valour, and your errors have proceeded from being unaccustomed to war, want of discipline, and the fatigue you had undergone. I do not blame you, but I call upon you for a reparation. And ye ! Women of

Abruzzi, Samnites, Irpinians and Daunians! you ought to be less indulgent; when your sons and your husbands return to your habitations, will you be weak enough to press them to your bosoms? Tell them that I expect them at Monteforte, where they must wash off the stains of Rieti."

I arrived however on the evening of the 11th at Castel de Sangro, where I didn't even find the two companies of sappers, who were attached to my head quarters, and had distinguished themselves greatly on the 7th. I wrote to the Regent and the deputies of the parliament, that my corps of the army would be rallied in a fortnight, and I was the more confident of this because I expected the national battalions from the Calabrias, from Bari, and from Lecce. "What happened to me in the Abruzzi," I added, "is a repetition of the important reverses which the Americans of the United States, and the French national guards met with in the first years of their revolution, and which the regular soldiers and national guards of Spain encountered almost always.* Of what value were the Portu-

* Several persons have asked me, why the Neapolitans did not imitate the Spaniards? The Neapolitans had no occasion to take a lesson from any other nation, as they had

guese troops, which are now so good and respectable, previous to the siege of Lisbon? In 1811 the soldiers of the Prussian army, now so distinguished, blushed to call themselves Prussians. If we look farther back, we shall find that the same thing happened to the Russians, under Peter the Great; and if we turn to more recent periods, we shall find that the Americans under Bolivar have met in the beginning with more serious reverses than have befallen the Neapolitan militia at Rieti. We ought to recollect that the Neapolitans set the first example of resistance to the victorious armies of France. They

themselves been the first to set the example of rising against a foreign army. But upon the present occasion they had been abandoned by their own government, and left without a single point of support to their courage, even in the most distant prospect. If they had had a national representation like the Spaniards, who had the Cortes at Cadiz to animate the nation; if they had been supported by a power like England; or if they had retained possession of Sicily and the fortresses, the Neapolitans would have displayed their natural energy. But they will yet do so the first favorable moment, and will prove how unjustly they have been appreciated by the rest of Europe. The Americans of the United States were not more successful in 1815, in defending their country against the English troops, than the Neapolitans. Yet who will be bold enough to say that the Americans did not deserve to be free.

merited the highest eulogiums from the French, for their conduct in Spain, in the Russian campaign, and at Dantzic and not less from the Austrians themselves, when they fought with them as allies in Italy, in 1814. As perseverance finally triumphs over all obstacles, let us still persevere."

On the 13th I reached Isernia, and on the 17th I obtained the Regent's permission to repair to Naples, leaving the wrecks of my corps under the command of a general. I have been blamed for returning to Naples, but my own feeling is, on the contrary, that I committed an error in not repairing there immediately after the 8th. The few hundred men that remained together after the disbanding could very safely be confided to a Maréchal de camp, and they could effect nothing. But the re-organization of the second corps, the revival of the national courage, and the turning to proper account the numberless resources which still remained to us, were all objects of first-rate importance to the national salvation. It has been reported that, after the disbanding the second corps, the soldiers and militia threatened their officers; this is an atrocious calumny, as the greater part of the troops and the national guards exhibited in

their behaviour, the shame and grief they felt at having disbanded themselves.

On my arrival at Naples, I represented to the Regent, and to the deputies, that the first corps of the army, consisting of thirty battalions of the line, three thousand gendarmes, and four regiments of cavalry, besides the national battalions, might, by entrenching itself behind Volturno, prevent the advance of the Austrians for at least ten days, (and they were still at a considerable distance from Capua,) and that during that time I should be able to re-organize the second corps, so as to make a movement on Campobasso, detaching some bodies of picked men, with able officers, to annoy the flanks and rear of the enemy. Even at the worst, both the first and second corps of the army might retreat into the provinces of Avellino, Salerno and Potenza on evacuating the capital. As the enemy on his arrival there, from not having possession of the Castle of St. Angelo, would be obliged to leave a large body of troops there, as well as in the Abruzzis, before Gaeta and Capua, it would be impossible for him to advance with impunity. With all that, having the command of the sea, we should be able to land detachments of partizans upon different points of the coast, and as

many troops as we could wish at Gaeta to take the enemy in the rear. A thousand efficacious and perhaps certain resources still remained to us; but they became useless, and were regarded as dangerous, because the Son and heir to the throne would have to make war against his Father, under the threats of the loss of his succession, when he ought to have fought without any regard to such considerations. The only act of weakness in the parliament at this time was the dispatching a message to your Majesty by General Fardella,* at the moment of your being surrounded by the enemy. The nation ought then to have regarded you as a royal captive, or as having abdicated the throne.

Meeting the deputy Borelli at the royal palace, as he was coming down from an interview with the Regent, I repeated to him what I had told his colleagues, "If you wish to save the country, let the Prince and his family, and the parliament, retire into Calabria or into Sicily; if you take that step, I will guarantee that the national energy alone will save it." Borelli, still flattering himself with the hope of a favorable answer from your Majesty by the return of Fardella, replied to me in these very words,

* See Appendix, No. XXII.

“Should the parliament imitate the flight of the soldiers?” This answer from a man so zealously devoted to the public service first opened my eyes to the real danger of the country. How the parliament could ever think of remaining at Naples with the royal family, when the enemy were within six hours march of the capital, even though the army of General Carascosa should have covered it according to military principles, is inconceivable. And yet the parliament was animated by the most patriotic feelings, as their last sitting clearly evinced.*

In pursuance of the decree of the Regent, relative to the re-organization of the second corps of the army, I set out for Salerno, where I found the whole population firmly disposed to co-operate in the defence of Neapolitan independence. I reviewed one of the national battalions, and dispatched circulars to the different provincial authorities, with orders to collect the battalions which had dispersed and had now began to rally, and to provide necessaries for the battalions which were on their march from Apulia and the Calabrias. I wrote at the same time to several deputies of the parliament, informing them that in a few days I should have under my

* See Appendix, No. XXIII.

command a force more than double what I had in the Abruzzi,—that I should be able to manœuvre on the enemy's flanks,—and that the national guards were longing for the moment of retrieving the reputation they had lost in the Abruzzi. During this period I had only a single aide-de-camp with me. The staff, the skeletons of the battalions of the line, a regiment of cavalry, the hill artillery, the generals and many of the other officers, and the quarter master and the commissariat, I expected to join my head quarters every moment. Becoming confident of the success of several plans, and meditating how to commence the campaign with advantage, an officer of my staff, Major Tanchi, came and announced to me that my corps d'armée would not be organized, and that all the persons whom I had expected, had received orders not to go beyond Capua. I am ignorant from what quarter this fatal and unforeseen blow proceeded, and leave it to time to discover its perfidious authors.* I immediately set out from Salerno

* If I had not been so treacherously stopped in the organization of the second corps, I should have had a sufficient force between Salerno and Avellino, to serve as a point of union for the deputies to the parliament, for the military officers, and the citizens who were most zealous in supporting the national independence at all hazard.

for Naples, in the hope of preventing its effects. But on the very evening of my arrival there, came the news of the total disbanding of the first corps of the army, without having either seen or heard the enemy. Several officers of the royal guards now declared themselves in the enemy's favor, and as a cloak to their infamy pretended to talk of their fidelity to your Majesty. I will not stop for a moment to develop the causes of the dissolution of this first corps, and it does not fall within my province to do so. Besides I should have neither moral conviction, nor documents to justify the opinions I may have formed on the subject; and it is the less necessary, as I have resolved to enter into no details, the precision of which may ever be called in question. But when the Neapolitans shall recover their liberty, and with that, their interest in public affairs, nothing will remain concealed.*

The effect of the disbanding the first corps of the army was such as to produce universal discou-

* The reader may wish to know what movements had been made by the first corps of the army, commanded by General Carascosa. This corps, not having passed the river Liri, never had occasion to see the enemy. The Austrians having obtained possession of the Abruzzi, it made a movement to retreat behind the Volturno (a large river about five leagues from Naples) and there it suddenly disbanded.

agement, as the Austrian army was thus enabled to enter Naples in a few hours, and it had been determined that the royal family, the regent and the parliament should wait their arrival. Even at that moment the country might have been saved, if the royal family and the parliament had passed over into Sicily. As the enemy could not for a considerable period have ventured beyond the capital, a number of bands of partizans might, in the interval, by landings upon the coast, and descents from the mountains, have spread themselves amidst the enemy; their knowledge of the existence and of the support of their national government would have soon enabled them to put him in a critical position; until at last the nation getting inured to war at his expence would have driven him out of the kingdom.

As to myself, having no longer a government, nor the semblance of a government, to fight for, without a single corps of regular troops under me to serve as a rallying point, and having no strong place on which to fall back, my plans changed every instant. The Calabrias, my native country, attracted my attention, but it became a matter of doubt whether I should even be able to reach Salerno in safety. The proclamations of your Majesty denouncing confiscation

of property, and death to all who dared to make resistance, threw the people into a state of consternation. The handful of persons devoted to absolute government shewed a disposition to assassinate every one who had made himself conspicuous in the national cause. On reaching Castellamare I was still undecided as to the plan I should adopt. Persons for whom I had, in common with the public, the greatest esteem, pressed me both in conversation and by letters not to allow the Austrians the pleasure of making me their prisoner, and to preserve my life for my country, as a cause so just could not be ruined for ever. They added that at a moment of discouragement like the present I should never be able to get a hundred men together, that I might be sure of losing my life by some hired assassin, and that the crime might be imputed to the whole nation. The Spanish Ambassador was impatient to see me gone, and advised me not to be obstinate in sacrificing myself without the least utility. At last a general, by means of a staff officer, sent me a despatch, inclosing a letter, in which were merely these words, "Depart immediately, or recollect that you have a brace of pistols."

I set sail for Barcelona between the 19th and 20th of March in a trading vessel, which had

been provided for me by the Spanish Ambassador the Chevalier d'Onis. It is not for me to decide if I adopted the most eligible plan. In the same despatch which was brought me by the staff officer before I set sail, I found a decree of the prince regent, nominating me to a special mission to the United States of America. The Regent, recollecting the events of 1799, granted permissions and passports to all the officers and deputies who wished to emigrate, and he sent me that apparent commission, that I might not be stopped by the allies, if I fell into their hands. To do away even the appearance of any thing equivocal, on my arrival at Barcelona,*I wrote to the minister of state at Madrid, in which after communicating the news of my arrival, and of the disasters which had befallen my country, I took occasion to speak of the commission which had been nominally given me by the constitutional government, and declared that I had not accepted it, as I neither recognized the military Austrian government in the kingdom, nor the absolute government of your Majesty. I felt justified in this by the oath which I had heard your Majesty twice pronounce: "As to what I have just sworn, or as to every other part of this oath, if I should contravene it, I ought not to be

* See Appendix, No. XXIV.

obeyed. Every thing which contravenes it must be considered as null, and of no value. If I keep this oath may God assist and defend me, if otherwise, may God punish me!"

I learned subsequently, that the parliament, whose patriotism was unquestionable, had, on the very day of the entry of the Austrians into Naples, made a protest, which will remain eternally engraved on the heart of every Neapolitan.*

I have now, Sire, demonstrated that if the nation was subjugated in a short space of time, it neither arose from want of patriotic feeling, and attachment to the constitutional government, nor from unwillingness to hazard life and property in the cause of national independence. The causes of that subjugation must be attributed to the mismanagement and tardy conduct of the executive in every thing connected with the war department; to the regent's bad state of health, inexperience, and incapability of supporting the fatigues of obstinate warfare; to his despondency under the reverses of the army, the threats of the allies, and the proclamations of your Majesty, although his loyalty, patriotism and attachment to the national honor are un-

* See Appendix, Nos. XXV and XXVI.

questionable ; *finally, to his declining to retire into Calabria, and completely abandoning in one day the nation and its resources to the enemy.* Had it not been for all these circumstances, the nation would have known how to defend itself, in spite of the errors that had been committed, and notwithstanding the disbanding of both corps of the army.

It is therefore most falsely that the ministers at Laybach, wished to attribute the easy and rapid successes of the Austrians to the total want of attachment in the Neapolitans to the constitutional government. Does the disbanding of Prince Ipsilanti's army prove that the Greeks are indifferent to their emancipation from the Ottoman yoke ? If, Sire, it be true, as has been asserted in several journals, that the nation was not at all desirous of a constitution,—as the small number of those who proclaimed it are now in prison or in exile,—why do not the Austrian troops evacuate the kingdom, and allow your Majesty to reign peaceably over the population of the Two Sicilies, who idolize the absolute “paternal government ?” They wish to make the political change in the kingdom be looked upon as the work of a few individuals ; if it was so, these individuals not only required no foreign

aid to effect it, but kept the kingdom in the best order, and assumed an imposing attitude towards powerful enemies. The majority of the nation which is represented as so devoted to absolute government, not only failed of itself to put down this "small number," but even the Austrian army shewed the greatest uncertainty, made use of every means of seduction, and desired to have your Majesty in the midst of it, to dissuade the people by your proclamations from making resistance, and to threaten with punishment all who did not lay down their arms. With all these expedients, what would the Austrians have been able to do, if the constitutional government had retired, I will not say into the Calabrias, but only as far as Salerno?

I will now, Sire! prove to your Majesty, that unless you restore the Constitution to which you swore fidelity, you will neither consult the good of the country, nor place your own tenure, or that of your dynasty, on the throne of the Two Sicilies, upon a firm basis. The same reasons in fact, which led your Majesty to disband the army and the national guards, still operate in full force, and will continue to do so. The troops of the line, and the national guards of all ranks who have served the constitu-

tional government having either directly through me, or through their officers, taken the oath of fidelity to it; we shall suppose the case that your Majesty would wish to fill up the ranks of the army with citizens who had *not* yet served, would not even they as Neapolitans, recollect that you yourself had in a solemn oath authorized the whole population of the Two Sicilies to refuse you obedience in the event of your infringing the Constitution you had sanctioned? And under all circumstances, if the military were forced to make their election between an oath taken to an *absolute monarch*, or that to a *constitutional king*, it may be asked which they would prefer? Your Majesty has already condemned several officers to death, among whom I am included. But if your Majesty had followed the received usages of Christian Europe, if you had appointed judges to try me, where would your Majesty have found in the army competent judges, as every officer in it had sworn to maintain the Constitution? Before your Majesty's departure for Laybach, on receiving the list of candidates from the parliament, your Majesty was graciously pleased to nominate me councillor of state.* Am I at

* See Appendix, No. XXVII.

liberty to suppose that at the very instant of giving me this proof of confidence, your Majesty intended to treat me as a rebel, as soon as you should have it in your power to do so?

As regards myself personally, it is of consequence to me to observe to your Majesty, that in January, 1799, when the French wished to convert the kingdom of Naples into one of their ephemeral republics, being then at the military college and not quite sixteen years old, I embraced the opportunity of entering into the first battalion raised by the new government, taking the side which at that time reckoned as its supporters the most distinguished persons in the state. Your ministers, without the least regard to my youth, condemned me to perpetual banishment, and caused me to be landed in France. In the midst of the French armies, it was not likely that I should lose the ideas of that period. Having returned to the kingdom in 1802, by virtue of the treaties with France, some juvenile acts of political imprudence induced the cruel ministers of your Majesty to condemn me in your name, and *without trial*, to end my days in the dungeon of Marettimo,* from

* In the island of Marettimo, which is thirty miles from Trapani, there is an ancient castle, in which there is an old cistern

which I was fortunately liberated after a three years confinement, the details of which would make humanity blush. And now, upon this last occasion, your Majesty's ministers, not satisfied with condemning me to death, have had the baseness to cause some persons who had been punished by the constitutional government, and were objects of national detestation, to emigrate under the mask of victims of the absolute government, for the express purpose of defaming to the utmost the deputies of parliament, who had taken refuge at Barcelona. These men also published a libel against myself, which I disdained to notice, as it is now rather a difficult matter to deceive the public, who have become accustomed to detect the instruments employed in different states by the police. The Prince

hollowed out of the side of a rock, that has been converted into a prison, and there, ever since 1799, the government has confined persons accused of obnoxious political opinions, without bringing them to trial. The partizans of despotism should remain there a few years to cure them of the affection with which an absolute monarch inspires them. There is also another dungeon in one of the two castles of Favignana, in which were long confined the late Prince of Torella, the present Duke of Riario Sforza, Baron Poerio, lately deputy to the parliament, (who has been again arrested,) as well as many other illustrious victims of 1799.

of Castelvicala, according to some French journalists, spread the report at Paris, that I had embarked with the army chest; a calumny so atrocious would have excited the laughter and contempt of my fellow citizens; but the case may be widely different in countries at a distance from it. Your Majesty knows, or ought to know, that the chest in question was delivered *untouched* to the pay-master-general Gazzari, and that I left in it sums which were due to me, as indemnities attached to my command, which I never dreamt of retaining, having then far different considerations at heart.

Sire! I espoused the cause of national liberty and independance, not from motives of self-interest or personal vanity, but solely with the view of benefitting my county. At all times I have remained firm to my principles. During the reign of Joachim, I was in continual opposition to his government, whenever any plans were agitated which I conceived to be prejudicial to the national interests; and neither the exceeding kindness with which I was treated by that unfortunate prince, the attachment and gratitude I felt for him, nor my admiration of the excellent qualities of his heart, made me ever forget that I was a Neapolitan.

I return, Sire, to my assertion, and must repeat to you that the nation can never forget the solemn protest of the parliament, at the moment of its dispersion by the Austrian bayonets. Still less will the Neapolitans forget that, during eight months, they excited the admiration of every nation; that so far from shedding a drop of blood, general opinion was respected; that the persons most openly opposed to the public good, were in no degree molested. They will also recollect that if a necessary system of defence involved the nation in the expences of an unavoidable war, that expenditure remained in the country, and was not employed in the support of foreign mercenaries, in the fomenting of intrigues, or in gratifying the cupidity of men who only serve the throne from interested motives. To continue therefore the system of unconstitutional government, your Majesty must be compelled to wound the national rights by the presence of a hostile army, for if your Majesty supposes that nations are changeable in their wishes and opinions, you deceive yourself exceedingly. In fact, are not the events of 1820 a corollary to those of 1799? And did the six years of despotism consolidate the government of Ferdinand VII. in Spain, when he fol-

lowed the advice of destroying the constitutional government? On the contrary those six years of illegitimate absolute power completely ripened for liberty that nation which was not entirely so in 1814, otherwise the king would never have been able to dissolve the Cortes at that time by a Spanish army. In reality your Majesty's ministers would be without the means of maintaining the absolute government for a single day, if the Austrian army was withdrawn. Sicily which at all times required very few troops, even after the discontented state she was left in, from having failed to establish her independance, is now kept down by 10,000 Austrians. The Sicilians will never forget the memorable epoch when they acquired liberty and glory, when king Peter of Arragon, although abandoned by the Spaniards, contrived with their sole aid to defend himself against a formidable league of the most powerful princes. Is it to be supposed that Austria will ever be able to keep our unfortunate country long under the yoke, at a period when the determination, and the propriety of converting despotic governments into constitutional monarchies are every day acquiring fresh strength and confirmation—when the Italians, hitherto united only by a common name and language,

are now become still more so by the ardent wish of being independent? Austria will perceive, and probably before long, how much her present policy is injurious to her interests. Is it possible that France, which, like the sun, is obscured by occasional eclipses, but never long loses its splendor, can forget the immortal glory she has acquired, and renounce for ever the exercise of that influence which she ought under all circumstances to possess in Europe? That great nation sleeps at present the sleep of the strong, but when she awakes, will she ever submit to see the whole of Italy under Austrian dominion and influence? And how could the advice ever be given to bind Naples and Piedmont in chains, at the time that even the Emperor Alexander was bestowing a constitution upon Poland? The Austrian minister said to prince Cimitile at Vienna, "Constitutions must be given by kings to their people, and not forced by people from their kings."—Austria, however, by virtue of secret treaties prevented your Majesty from granting that constitution to your people which you had promised them.* Thus, to please the Austrian ministry, we were to remain for ever the

* See Appendix, No. XXVIII.

slaves of despotism, even when our own monarch had felt it to be indispensable to grant us a representative government. And there are still men, who admire the policy of the Austrian cabinet!

Sire! at the time when the constitutional government was proclaimed at Naples, in Portugal, and in Piedmont, none of those nations knew what passed in the other. As it is clear therefore that the friends of liberty in Europe acted without connection with each other, why did not the ministers advise their sovereigns to occupy themselves exclusively with their own states, and to listen to the reasonable demands of their people, instead of answering them at the point of the bayonet? The ministerial oligarchy will not long enjoy the triumph of force over the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, as the people of Europe, taught wisdom by the events at Naples, have seen the necessity of making common cause. And to show your Majesty the rapid diffusion of liberal ideas, notwithstanding the obstacles which impede their progress, observe how these same Russians, who left their country a few months since to put down liberty in the south of Europe, are now burning with impatience to deliver the Greeks from the yoke of despotism! And yet the Greeks had no national representation nominated by the people in obe-

dience to a royal proclamation;—their ears had never been gratified, like ours, with hearing the solemn compact, sanctified by oaths, nor the solemn protest of our representatives, who, rivals of the august Roman Senators, remained in the hall of the parliament, invoking the vengeance of an offended deity, and ready to expiate with their lives the fault of their unlimited confidence. But the enemy was neither cruel enough to put them to death, nor generous enough to respect them.

All that I request, Sire! is that your Majesty, on the perusal of this Narrative, will consult, not your ministers, but your own conscience; and perhaps your Majesty will be convinced that it is not yet too late to restore the constitutional government, to maintain the respect of oaths, and thus to reconcile yourself with your people. This spontaneous act on your part will sufficiently prove to posterity, that although the nation was betrayed, it was not by its monarch, who in 1817 chose to take the name of FERDINAND THE FIRST, as an earnest of becoming the FIRST Neapolitan prince to bestow liberty upon his country.

As to myself, I have sacrificed everything but my life, for the cause of national liberty, and

the acute sorrow which I feel for its failure will never cease until I shall see my fellow citizens restored to happiness, or until I shall have once more the opportunity of shedding my blood for the independence and glory of our country.— But should it be my lot to fall before I behold her restored to the admiration of Europe, and to the possession of those liberties to which the people of the Two Sicilies have acquired the most sacred rights,—the Italians will perhaps honor my memory with a tear, and say of their countryman, William Pepe, that although he was abandoned by fate and by man, his own perseverance never forsook him.

I am, Sire,

Your Majesty's most humble and
respectful Servant,

WILLIAM PEPE,

Lieutenant General.

the acute sorrow which I feel for its failure will
 never cease until I shall see my fellow citizens
 restored to happiness, or until I shall have once
 more the opportunity of shedding my blood for
 the independence and glory of our country.—
 But should it be my lot to fall before I behold
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No. I.

PROCLAMATION OF HIS MAJESTY, THE KING OF THE
TWO SICILIES, *published at Palermo, May 1st, 1815.*

NEAPOLITANS!

THE cause of Murat is lost, a cause not less shameful than unjust. A new prospect is already before your eyes.

People of Samnium, of Lucania, of Magna Græcia, and of Apulia! Prepare to reclaim your rights which a stranger has violated. Possessing himself of the finest portion of Italy, he has, under the title of conqueror, robbed you of your property, and exposed your sons and brothers to the dangers and horrors of war. Recollect that there was a time when the fame of your arms extended to the borders of the Nile, and when at the sound of your warlike trumpets the Ptolemies, the Philips, the Massinissas, the Antiochuses, and the Mithridateses bent their proud necks before you.

Italians! will you imbrue your hands in the blood of Italians! Your sons and fathers are hastening from Rome to assist you in shaking off the chains of slavery and dishonor; will you dare to repulse them with parricidal hands? What is it you can henceforward expect of a fugitive and perfidious soldier?—Opprobrium, misery, contempt, and death.—Such is the harvest you will reap from obeying the commands of him who is only leading you to destruction. Can he who seeks in despair his last resource ever make you enjoy glory and peace? A prince is now on the road to save you; his victorious eagles bring to your territory peace, wealth, and tranquillity. The sword and death will

drive far from your country your enemy and oppressor. All private property will be sacred.

And you, docile children of Sebeto ! come with the standards of concord, come and meet your father and deliverer, who is already under your walls. He seeks only to promote your good, and durable felicity. He will use every effort to make you objects of envy to the rest of Europe. A government, stable, wise, and religious, is assured to you. *The people will be the sovereign, and the monarch will only be the depository of the laws which shall be decreed by a constitution, the most energetic and desirable.*

Open your temples and sanctuaries. Your father will enter them with uncovered head to deliver their ministers and ordinances from persecution. Sing hymns of gratitude to the GOD OF ARMIES, who has delivered you from oppression, and saved you from ruin. Let the ornaments and sacred symbols of that religion, which has planted its standards amidst the most cruel and the most obstinate wars, be always invincible and respected.

Run, fly, into the arms of a generous father, who is prepared to stretch to you the hand of forgiveness, who only remembers your offences to unite, and to govern you as a father. Can you possibly doubt the promises of that father, who, born among you, has every thing in common with you, laws, manners, and religion?

In the name of the Congress, I re-ascend my legitimate throne, and at the same time, promise you general forgiveness and affection.

(Signed) FERDINAND.

No. II.

LETTER FROM GENERAL PEPE TO GENERAL COLONNA,
*commanding the Third Military Division.**

Naples, July 2nd. 1820.

MARSHAL,

UPON receipt of this, you will order the companies of militia of Monteforte and Mercugliano to march between Monteforte and Cardinale, to preserve tranquillity upon the high road. The companies of Atripalda and Avellino must remain at Avellino. You will order all the companies of militia to assemble in the chief towns of their districts, to be ready to march.

You will make all the militia sensible that their general, who has executed so desirable an organization, will be with them the first possible moment; that with them alone, he will maintain good order in the division, and will convince the sovereign that armed citizens are the firmest support to the throne.

You will let all the militia who may leave their districts understand that they will be paid. Meantime, keep good order at Avellino, and let the different authorities be properly respected.

WILLIAM PEPE,

Lieutenant General.

P.S. Keep the troops collected, as well as the number of militia you think necessary.—Let it be known that the whole kingdom enjoys the most perfect tranquillity.

* I wrote this letter from the cabinet of the Captain-General Nugent, who, after reading it, handed it to my aide-de-camp, who took his leave in the general's presence. It was impossible for me to write more clearly or to give more precise orders; I also sent a number of useful instructions verbally.

No. III.

FIRST LETTER FROM THE REGENT TO GENERAL PEPPE.

Naples, 8th July, 1820.

GENERAL,

THE king, my august father, having resolved to accept the constitution, as he has clearly declared by his decree of this day, we are all henceforward united, and excited to labour in conjunction, at the great work of our political regeneration. You were one of the first to raise the glorious cry of independence, which makes me extremely anxious to avail myself of your services and opinions. At the moment of my writing this, I have received your letter of the 7th, which gives me another proof of your generous intentions and excellent constitutional principles.

The greater part of the articles you have proposed to me in your memoir, have been already approved by my august father, as you may have had an opportunity of observing. In some of the others I should wish to make some modifications, required by the public interest, and equally conformable to constitutional principles. For that purpose I send you two commissioners invested with my full confidence, the Chevalier Beneventani and the Baron Nanni, with full powers to conclude the matter with you, and I hereby declare my approbation to whatever you agree with them, as to the points proposed in your letter and in the memoir accompanying it.

FRANCIS,

Vicar General.

No. IV.

SECOND LETTER FROM THE REGENT TO GENERAL PEPE.

Naples, July 12, 1820.

GENERAL IN CHIEF,

THE proposition you have submitted to me is an evident proof of the moderation of your character, and of the noble disinterestedness which governs your actions. While I properly appreciate such brilliant qualities, I do not hesitate to declare to you that I concur in your sentiments, and that I think it will be to the general advantage to abolish the office of Captain-General. With this feeling I shall not fail to do every thing that depends upon me to effect that abolition.

FRANCIS,

Vicar General.

To Lieutenant General Pepe,

General in Chief of the Army of Naples.

No. V.

THIRD LETTER FROM THE REGENT TO GENERAL PEPE,
*to stop the Execution of some Deserters from the Regiment
 of Farnese.**

Naples, July 20, 1820.

GENERAL,

My royal heart being penetrated with the wish that the glorious days of the political regeneration of the kingdom, which was effected with so much tranquillity, should not be saddened by a numerous execution of the same brave men, who have at other times, shewn so much zeal for good order, and whom a moment of relaxation had led to deviate from the path of honor, I grant their pardon, commuting the punishment of death for the first degree of confinement.

FRANCIS,

Vicar General.

Lieutenant General Pepe,

General in Chief of the Army of Naples.

* This letter falsifies the reports which some of the foreign ministers addressed to their courts, in which they described the kingdom as plunged in anarchy. It proves at the same time the noble and loyal character of his Royal Highness the Vicar General. The soldiers who were to have been shot were of the regiment of Farnese, and had, from a misunderstanding, fired upon the cavalry at the Magdalen bridge.

No. VI.

THE OATH TAKEN BY THE KING,

On the 1st of October, 1820.

WE, Ferdinand the First, by the grace of God, and the Constitution of the Monarchy, King of the Two Sicilies, swear by God and the Holy Evangelists, to defend and preserve the Catholic, Apostolic and Roman Religion, permitting no other within the kingdom. I swear that I will observe and cause to be observed the political Constitution and laws of the Neapolitan monarchy, without any other consideration than its advantage; that I will neither exchange, cede, nor dismember any part of the kingdom; that I will never demand any tax, either in fruit, money or other objects, other than those which have been decreed by the parliament; that I will never possess myself of the property of any one, and that I will respect above all the political liberty of the nation and that of every individual. If I should happen to contravene what I have sworn to, or any part of it, I ought not to be obeyed, but on the contrary, whatever I may do to contravene it shall be null and void. If I keep this oath, may God assist and defend me! and if I do otherwise, may He punish me!

No. VII.

SPEECH OF GENERAL PEPE TO THE KING,
On the 1st of October, 1820.

SIRE,

I BEHOLD your Majesty, surrounded by the representatives of the nation, seated upon a throne of glory, and the object of public love and gratitude. This is the most memorable and happy epoch in our history. My wishes are now accomplished. Faithful to my promise, and to my constitutional principles, I now lay at the feet of your Majesty, and in the presence of the national representatives, the command of the army, which attachment to my country, and to the real interests of your Majesty, alone led me to accept.

Happy in the bosom of repose, I will always be the first to execute your Majesty's commands, and to shed my blood for the defence of the constitution and the throne, whatever may be the rank which it may please your Majesty to grant me.

May Heaven load with every felicity your Majesty and your august Family, and preserve you for the gratitude and affection of your people! May Heaven grant to your faithful and virtuous citizens, the peaceful enjoyment of a Constitution, which will establish their prosperity, and your Majesty's throne, upon a foundation not to be shaken!

No. VIII.

REPLY OF THE KING TO GENERAL PEPE.

I ACCEPT your resignation, and at the same time express to you my satisfaction and gratitude for the manner in which you have succeeded in preserving order and tranquillity during the events that have taken place.

No. IX.

LETTER OF THE REGENT TO GENERAL PEPE,
respecting the resignation of his command.

Naples, 30th September, 1820.

THE assurance you have given me in your letter of this day of your intention of resigning to-morrow the chief command of the army, in presence of the representatives of the nation, only serves to give me a farther proof of those sentiments of honor and disinterestedness which I have had occasion to observe in you, during the time that you have had the command of the army, for the improvement of which you have neither spared pains nor application.

I am convinced that the same generous sentiments will make you ready to fly at all times to the defence of the constitutional throne of the king, my august father, and of our national independence. In the mean time I will not neglect making use of your knowledge and patriotic zeal upon every occasion that may offer, until I am able to satisfy the wish you express to me of having an appointment to a foreign court.

I thank you for the attachment you manifest to the king, my father, to myself, and to the nation. And I am

your very affectionate

FRANCIS.

To Lieutenant General

William Pepe.

No. X.

LETTER OF THE PARLIAMENT TO GENERAL PEPE.

*National Parliament of the Two Sicilies,**Naples, 12th October, 1820.*

GENERAL,

THE parliament has heard with pleasure the sentiments expressed in your letter, and could not do otherwise than admire them, as exhibiting your distinguished character, and acquiring you fresh trophies in the cause of liberty and your country. You were one of the first promoters of our political regeneration; but your moderation in the bosom of that glory which surrounds you is the noblest virtue which adorns your heart. The country will know how to appreciate the services you have rendered it; and the parliament, as the interpreter of the national feelings, begs to express to you its gratitude and satisfaction.

Washington, after having delivered his country from the fear of foreign influence, gave the most signal example of moderation to mankind. The examples of heroism speak solely to the hearts of those to whom nature has been prodigal of generous and sublime sentiments. You, General, have imitated that great man, and have shown that you were worthy to be one of the first to raise the cry of national independence. Continue therefore, General, in the career of glory, whatever be the rank it may please the king to give you, and prove to Europe that you are worthy of the sincere eulogiums which the whole nation lavishes upon you.

Signed by the Secretaries,

TITUS BERNI,

VINCENT NATALE,

NAZARE COLANERI,

FERDINAND DE LUCCA.

No. XI.

LETTER from the REGENT to General PEPE, to thank him for his offer, (after resigning the command of the army) of going to join his Brother under the walls of Palermo, and serving as his aide-de-camp.*

Naples, 4th October, 1820.

GENERAL,

I HAVE read with great pleasure your letter of yesterday's date, in which you ask my permission to go and serve in quality of aide-de-camp to your brother, at present under the walls of Palermo. This request affords me a fresh proof of your attachment and zeal for the interests of the king, my august father, and for those of the nation, divested of every feeling of private interest or ambition. I will consider if your offer can be accepted, but in the mean time I cannot conceal from you the regret I should feel at seeing you removed from us at a moment when your services may be so essential.

In expressing to you the sentiments of my grateful regard.

I am, &c.

FRANCIS,

Vicar General.

* General William Pepe, after having resigned the chief command of the army, seeing the difficult situation in which his brother was placed, before the walls of Palermo, having only six thousand disposeable troops, in want of artillery and ammunition, and having to combat not only the city of Palermo, but also several neighbouring towns, who had repulsed a column of ten thousand men commanded by Colonel Flugi, which was hastening to the assistance of the troops before Palermo, under these circumstances made the above application to his Royal Highness the Vicar General.

No. XII.

LETTER FROM GENERAL FLORESTANO PEPE TO THE KING.

Naples, 22nd. November, 1820.

SIRE,

THE noble recompence which your Majesty has been pleased to grant me, far exceeds every thing which I have deserved ; my gratitude will only cease with my existence. I beseech your Majesty, however, to listen to some respectful observations which are drawn from me by the painful situation in which I am placed.

I was sent into Sicily entirely contrary to my own wishes. I was neither the oldest nor the youngest of the Lieutenant Generals in your Majesty's army. I had been living for the last five years wholly unemployed, when, without in the least knowing wherefore, I was nominated to this command. My sense of duty put me under the necessity of obeying the orders of his Royal Highness the Vicar General, of the Junta, and of the ministers of the interior and of war, who would not admit the excuses I alledged for declining the acceptance of it. Having determined to obey, I received my instructions, and followed them without altering their meaning. In the application of these instructions, in concert with the Prince of Paterno, on the part of his countrymen, to the measures of conciliation considered to be necessary, I only suppressed some expressions very unsuitable to the dignity of the government.

I must respectfully acquaint your Majesty, that the troops employed in the expedition, although they were unprovided with artillery and ammunition, and had to encounter a force at least ten times their number, in presence of a vast city, surrounded with walls, protected by bastions, forts, and four hundred pieces of cannon, well supplied, have under all these disadvantages acquired a great superiority; of this I should never have dreamt of taking advantage to make any change in what was prescribed to me. I was besides persuaded that without in the least transgressing my instructions, there were just and noble methods of effecting the gratification of the general wish.

The Sicilians, deceived in the promises which were made to them, might have accused me of betraying them. Their generosity, of which I shall never lose the recollection, has not even suspected me of such baseness.

Sire! Your Majesty's rewards are extremely flattering; under any other circumstances I should have felt myself singularly honoured in accepting that which your Majesty has been pleased to offer me. Notwithstanding the sentiments of respect and attachment which I owe to your Majesty, I find myself under the necessity of refusing a recompense, which I cannot accept, as there has been a breach of the promises which I had made, in conformity to my instructions. This step is the only one which is left me, to show myself worthy of the esteem with which the Sicilians have been pleased to honor me.

The gallant and noble conduct of the officers and soldiers under my orders calls for the particular notice of your Majesty.



They have overcome immense difficulties. It is undoubtedly a melancholy glory to have to fight with our fellow citizens, but distinguished military actions always deserve praise and rewards. The hope of advancement opens a wider field for the display of bravery and talent, and supplies them with better opportunities of making their services useful to the state. I beseech your Majesty to lend a favorable ear to the representation I have made in their favor, through the minister of war, and to the request I have made to his Royal Highness, that he would be good enough to second it with your Majesty.

Sire! In the first dispatch, which I sent from Palermo by the chief of my staff, I announced to the minister at war, that the state of my health would not allow me to continue on active service, and requested permission to retire. I renew my application to your Majesty, that your Majesty will have the goodness to order a commission of inquiry into my services, and permit me to retire from the service.

I am, with the most profound respect, &c. &c.

FLORESTANO PEPE,
Lieutenant General.



No. XIII.

MESSAGE FROM THE KING TO THE PARLIAMENT,

December 8, 1820.

FERDINAND I. by the Grace of God, and the Constitution of the Monarchy, King of the United Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, King of Jerusalem, Infant of Spain, Duke of Parma, Placentia Castro, Hereditary Great Prince of Tuscany:

TO MY FAITHFUL DEPUTIES,

I LEARN with much concern, that my faithful Deputies do not view with the same eyes as myself, the resolution which I communicated to them yesterday, the 7th. instant.

To avoid all cause of misunderstanding, I declare that I have never had an idea of infringing the Constitution to which I have sworn; but by my decree of the 7th of July last, I had reserved to the representatives of the nation, the right of proposing the modifications which they judged necessary to make in the Constitution of Spain. I have thought, and still think, that my intervention at the Congress of Laybach may be useful to the interests of the country, in order to have the sanction of the Allied Powers to such modifications, as, without destroying the rights of the nation, may do away every cause of war. In no case will any modification be accepted, which has not my consent, and that of the nation. I declare, besides, that I have

intended, and do intend, to conform myself to article 172, sec 2, of the Spanish Constitution. I declare, finally, that I have not intended to prescribe any other suspension during my absence, than that of the modifications in the Constitution, and by no means of any legislative acts.

FERDINAND.

No. XIV.

MESSAGE FROM THE KING TO THE PARLIAMENT,

December 10, 1820.

FERDINAND I. by the Grace of God and the Constitution of the Monarchy, King of the United Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, &c. &c.

TO MY FAITHFUL DEPUTIES,

YOUR decision of the 8th inst. says, amongst other things, that the parliament has not the power of assenting to my departure, unless it be to support the Constitution of Spain, to which we have sworn in common. I declare to you afresh, that my intervention at the Congress at Laybach has no other view than that of supporting the Constitution of Spain, which we have sworn to as our social compact, and to add, in conformity to your message of the 9th inst. that such is the will and decision of my people.

If my message of the 7th inst. has been otherwise understood, I believe that that of the 8th. has already put an end to every cause of misunderstanding.

Having made these declarations, I desire the parliament to decide, in positive terms, if it consents to my intervention at the Congress of Laybach, in order to support there the general will of the nation for the Constitution which has been adopted, and thus to dispel the threats of war.

In the affirmative case, I desire that the parliament will also explain itself with regard to my proposition of confirming to my son, the Duke of Calabria, the powers of Vicar General.

The parliament confiding in my fidelity, which I will justify with the grace of God, has thought it unnecessary to let four of its deputies accompany me. My object in desiring this was to have the advantage of their information and opinions; if after this explanation, the parliament regards this measure as useful, I cannot but be satisfied; at the same time, I by no means require it as the condition of my own intervention at the Congress. Finally, as the Allied Sovereigns expect a speedy answer from me, I desire that the parliament should pronounce without delay on the questions I have submitted to it.

FERDINAND.

No. XV.

LETTER FROM THE REGENT TO GENERAL PEPE,
communicating to him the news of the approach of the
*Austrians.**

Naples, 15th February, 1821.

I HAVE just learned that some strangers arrived this morning bring positive intelligence, that yesterday, the 14th inst. the head of the Austrian column, which was descending the Marches, would be at Rimini. I have thought it proper to let you know this for your guidance; and knowing your zeal for the defence of the country, I am, &c.

FRANCIS.

* This letter proves our total ignorance of the enemy's movements, and that up to that day no preparations for war had been made in the Abruzzi. If, at the approach of the first of the enemy's columns, I had had my corps of the army organized in the Abruzzi, I should have fought the Austrians in detail.

No. XVI.

DECREE nominating GENERAL WILLIAM PEPE, to the
chief command of the Second Corps of the Army. *

Naples, 16th February, 1821.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

HIS Royal Highness the Prince Regent, by his decree of the 12th inst. has appointed you commander in chief of the second corps of the army. I acquaint your Excellency of it for your guidance.

The Minister at War,

PARISI.

To His Excellency Lieutenant-General William Pepe,
Inspector General of Militia, of the National
Guards, and of those of Safety.

* Military men, and men of all parties, who think that the Neapolitans were deficient in patriotism and bravery, ought to remark attentively, that the enemy reached Bologna on the 8th of February, and on the 20th. made his appearance on the frontiers of the Abruzzi. General Pepe however was still at Naples on the 16th., having not till then received his nomination to the chief command of the second corps of the army. It was not until that very day also, that the militia, who had never been united in battalions, not even once, received orders to march. And yet 50,000 Austrians fell upon this general, who had to guard a line of frontier of 150 miles in extent, and to defend the Abruzzi, with very few regular troops, and only a part of the national guards, who for the first time left their fire-sides, executed forced marches, and slept without great coats on the snow.

No. XVII.

LETTER OF THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR, CHEVALIER
D'ONIS, TO GENERAL PEPE.

Naples, 27th February, 1821.

GENERAL,

I HAVE received the letter which you honored me with of the 24th inst. and learn by it the good dispositions you have made for the defence of the Abruzzi.

I ought, however, to apprise your Excellency, that by the letters I have received from Rome, it is to be feared that you will be attacked in the Abruzzi, on the right, by the whole Austrian force. General Carascosa has not preserved the positions upon the Sabina, as I always imagined he would, to keep in immediate communication with you, but only those upon San Germano, which leaves him entirely isolated and detached; and as it is almost beyond a doubt that the enemy's object will be to destroy your Excellency's force, as the only, or the principal obstacle to the annihilation of liberty, my friendship for you has led me to give you this intimation, that you may take your measures in consequence. At the same time I will urge your brother to send you all the reinforcements possible.

I beg you to accept the assurance of my highest esteem and consideration.

THE CHEVALIER D'ONIS.

To His Excellency General William Pepe.

No. XVIII.

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL PEPE TO THE
ABRUZZIANS, AND TO HIS ARMY.

To the Abruzzians, and to the Militia, Legionaries, and Troops composing the Second Corps of the Army.

His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent, has done me the honor of nominating me to the command on the whole line of the Abruzzi, of the Second Corps of the Army, consisting of Militia and Legionaries of Abruzzi, Samnites, Irpinians, Daunians, a battalion of Calabrese, the Sacred Battalion, and regular Troops of every description. I will be your brother in arms, but I shall require the most rigid observance of military discipline, in which we shall find a sure guarantee of the most brilliant successes. I will seek, from the Prince Regent, for a speedy recompense for every distinguished act of any of you; not that you stand in need of such incitements, but only in order that heroic actions may be made known.

On the other hand, every act of disobedience and crime will be most severely punished. The orders of the day, reported in the constitutional journal, will convey to your fellow citizens, relatives, and wives, the names of all who have distinguished or disgraced themselves on the field of honor.

Militia and Legionaries of Abruzzi! who at present do not form part of the battalions on active service, if we should engage the enemy at a short distance from your districts, you will hasten to collect yourselves at the first alarm of danger, and whenever any of the enemy's troops separate in the fields for the purpose

of pillaging, then, Abruzzians, content yourselves with disarming them, and conducting them to the nearest post. Cruelty is not the character of a brave man, and a free man is generous.

Militia, Legionaries, and Soldiers! the day of glory will soon dawn upon us. The second corps of the army will be the first to oppose itself to a mercenary enemy. Seven millions of fellow citizens wait impatiently for the first news of our exploits. Old men die after having exhausted the resources of the medical art, and after having experienced the pity, and frequently the contempt, of their fellow creatures. Young men die in a thousand ways, overwhelmed with suffering, and surrounded by selfish successors, who take no pains to disguise their ingratitude It is perhaps our lot to die for the glory of our country, for the support of the constitutional throne, or for the security of our liberties and property. Are not some days of shorter existence amply compensated by a delightful and glorious death, accompanied by the blessings of the present and future generations?

• The enemy is advancing to our frontiers, and from what motives? Are we the first or the last to give ourselves a constitution? Why does not he direct himself against Spain and Portugal? Shall we be, forsooth, the *Helots* of the delirious Austrian ministry!—we, who have resumed the classical names of our ancestors who balanced the power of the masters of the world? The Austrian ministry say to the Neapolitans, “Recal the oaths which you and your monarch have sworn so solemnly. Return under the yoke of absolute power, under which you have lived so many

centuries. Imagine that you have slept for seven months, and consider as dreams the applauses and admiration which you have extorted from the whole world. Do as the players, who after having acted the parts of heroes, return to their ordinary insignificance. If you consent to so much infamy we will allow the greater part of you to live, and vegetate, and weep. Last year you finished the payment to Austria of the last portion of an immense sum. This year you will begin by paying a new tribute. As for us, in order to make sure that you can never throw off our yoke, we will occupy your country with 60,000 of our mercenaries; we will strip you, for the second time, of all your artillery, and your whole means of defence. We will disband your army and your national guards. They themselves will commit to the flames their clothing, which has cost more than three millions of ducats. Finally, the land tax, and all the contributions shall be fixed at our pleasure."—Abruzzians, Militia, Legionaries, Soldiers of the line, the day is come when we have to reply to all these insults in the name of seven millions of Neapolitans. The enemy has decreed at Laybach your glory and your grandeur.—Tottea, the 19th of February, 1821.

WILLIAM PEPE.

No. XIX.

INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE REGENT TO GENERAL PEPE.

Naples, 20th February, 1821.

1. THE kingdom of Naples may be attacked through the Abruzzi, by Sora and Ceprano, and through Itri. The political and military position of our coasts render attacks by sea impossible, or of no effect.

2. The defence of the Abruzzi is entrusted to you, and to the troops of the Second Corps of the Army. General Carascosa and his troops will defend the two other parts of the frontier.

3. The enemy has not yet developed his plan, or his forces. But I will suppose two cases : first, that he makes a feint of attack on the Abruzzi, for the purpose of concentrating his forces on another point of the frontier ; or secondly, that, on the contrary, he merely observes the other parts of the frontier, and directs the mass of his force upon the Abruzzi. The territory which you have to defend, will thus become either the secondary or primary object of the war.

4. If it becomes the secondary, you will assist the left wing of the army in two ways, either by reinforcing the first corps with some of your battalions, or by harassing the flanks and rear of the enemy, or by counter attacks. Circumstances will determine your adoption of either of those means. It is unnecessary to observe to a general of your experience, that the Abruzzi always forms the base of your operations in the assistance you render to the right wing, either by counter attacks, or lateral movements ;

and that in consequence all your movements must be exclusively supported by that part of the frontier.

5. But if the Abruzzi become the primary object of the war, the first corps of the army will afford you assistance by reinforcements of troops and manœuvring. The nature and extent of these must depend upon circumstances. After these general observations I will descend to the particular circumstances attending a war in the Abruzzi.

6. Our system is defensive, as best adapted to our territory and to the justice of our cause. It is certain, however, that the passive neutrality of the Pope, and the invasion of his States by the enemy, will give the Neapolitan troops a right to go beyond the frontiers of the kingdom, and occupy such positions as may be deemed necessary for its defence. You have, therefore, an unlimited discretion in your strategical operations.

7. You will treat the papal government with every degree of respect, and behave to the inhabitants of its provinces which you occupy with justice. With that view, you will take care to prevent the troops from doing the least injury to the property of the inhabitants, or the authorities of the country. The provisions which you may require for the subsistence of the army must be paid for with punctuality, and the military command, which is necessarily established in the occupation of a country, must only be exercised upon your own troops. If the conduct of His Holiness should oblige us to change our system, the national parliament will decide upon it at the proper time, and you will be apprized of that decision.

8. As Aquila is the key of the Abruzzi, should the enemy succeed in making himself master of that point, he would turn the defiles of Forca di Penne, and of Popoli; Chieti and Pescara would lose all their importance of front, and be left abandoned to their own resources. The plan of defence in that case would require an entire change; we could no longer prevent the passage of Liri, and the defensive system would receive a very serious blow.

Should Aquila be only observed, and powerfully menaced by the enemy, he might make a vigorous attack on the side of the Apennines, which looks towards the Adriatic; or he might succeed in forcing the passage of Forca di Penne, and the defiles of Popoli, the result of which would be to us the loss of Aquila.

9. The importance of that place therefore renders it necessarily the centre of the defensive sphere, of which Teramo, Civitella, Ascoli, Montereale, Accumoli, Norcia, Leonessa, Spoleto, Antrodoco, Rieti, Terni, Tagliacozzo, Carsoli, Tivoli, Forca di Penne, Strette di Popoli, Chieti and Pescara, must be considered as so many rays. In the event of the enemy making himself master of any one of these rays, Aquila is lost. Or in order to defend it, you might be obliged to fight a battle, a method which must be avoided in a defensive war, unless you have the certainty of gaining it.

10. The positions which should have the greatest number of troops to defend them are Civitella, Leonessa, Antrodoco, and Rieti; and Civitella is the most important of these four, as it

defends the passage of the Tronto, and as it keeps the enemy's troops in check after passing the river.

The nature of our system will oblige the enemy to fortify as he advances ; it will suit us to oppose works to works, or rather to oppose our positions to his works. The tardiness which is the result of this reciprocal system is entirely to his disadvantage.

11. The road, or rather the path, which skirts the Umano, and which leads from the pass of that river to Montorio, is the line of operations, of which Aquila is the base, and Teramo, Civitella and Ascoli, are the points. It ought consequently to be vigorously defended.

Should the enemy obtain possession of it, he would cut off Civitella and Teramo, he would facilitate the occupation of Aquila, and he would become master of another important part of the Abruzzi.

The path in question is extraordinarily steep and rugged, a most favorable circumstance for the defence of the country, but the reverse, if it should be lost, either wholly or partially, as the enemy can easily fortify himself in the part which he occupies, and thereby maintain permanent possession of it.

12. It would be desireable to fortify several points, and to entrust the defence of them to the inhabitants. If the Austrians do not change their usual system, they will go on, extending the sphere of their operations ; a necessary plan for obtaining the means of subsistence in a hilly, barren, and ill-disposed country.

13. You will herewith receive, General,

1. A map of the whole country, which is likely to become the theatre of war.

2. A map of another part of the ground, having for its limits our frontier on the South; the River Esino on the North; the chain of the Apennines as far as Fabriano on the West; and the coast of the Adriatic, between the passes of Tronto and that of the Esino, on the East.

3. The military surveys of the Abruzzi, as well as of the other points hereafter mentioned:

The side of that part of the Apennines which faces the Adriatic, and which is in the Abruzzi.

The summits of the Apennines.

The valley of Nera, (called of Norcia) and *in proscenium* those of Velino as far as Rieti, and those of Salto, and Juriano, as far as Carsoli and Tagliacozzo.

The valley of Sizi, (called of Nerfa) and of Roveto, which ends it in the plain of Sora.

To these I add the surveys and military observations which regard the ground delineated in the map No. 2. All these materials will be of service to you for warlike operations.

14. You will correspond frequently with the General Staff of the Army, with General Carascosa, who commands the first corps, and with the minister at war.

15. The latitude of operations of the two commanders in chief is contained in the limits of the present instructions; in war, however, every thing depends on local circumstances. You

are not absolutely forbidden from deviating from these instructions, but the general who does so is under two obligations, 1. to justify his operations ; 2. to give immediate notice to the general staff, to the minister at war, and to all the generals who command divisions which may be implicated in the change of movement.

FRANCIS,

Regent.

N.B. You will receive in a few days a copy of the Instructions given to General Carascosa.

No. XX.

PROCLAMATION OF THE KING TO THE NEAPOLITANS.

February 25th, 1821.

FERDINAND the First, by the Grace of God, King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

THE solicitude of our heart, expressed in our letter of the 28th January, addressed to our well-beloved son the Duke of Calabria, and the declaration conformable thereto, made at the same time, by the ministers of the Allied Sovereigns, must have taken away all doubt from the minds of our people, as to the consequences to which the deplorable events of last July, and their results, were likely to expose our kingdom.

Our paternal heart cherished the strongest hope, that our first intimations would have been sufficient to restore the reign of prudence and moderation, and to prevent a blind fanaticism from exposing the kingdom to those calamities, which it has been our constant endeavor to avert from it.

Confiding entirely in that hope, we thought it our duty to prolong our residence at the place where the Allied Sovereigns were assembled, in order to second to the last moment, with all our efforts, the determinations which should be taken at Naples, and thus effect the object of our most ardent wishes, as conciliator and pacificator; this is the only consolation which in our old age could compensate our chagrin, the severity of the season, and the fatigues of a long journey. But the persons who have the momentary exercise of power at Naples, overpowered by a malignant few, have been deaf to our voice; and

with a view to seduce our people, have endeavoured to deceive them by a false report, most injurious to the great monarchs who are our allies,—that we were in a state of constraint. It is unnecessary to reply to an imputation so false and infamous.

As, in consequence of these and other perfidious suggestions, our longer residence in the midst of our allies cannot have the effect which we originally hoped from it, we shall immediately commence our journey, to return to our states. In this situation it is a duty we owe to ourselves and to our people, to make known to them our paternal and royal sentiments.

The long experience of a sixty year's reign has given us the means of knowing the inclinations and real desires of our subjects. Confiding in the rectitude of their intentions, we shall, with the aid of the Most High, know how to satisfy their desires in the most just and permanent manner. We declare in consequence, that the army which is advancing upon our territory must not be regarded by our faithful subjects as an enemy, but as destined solely to protect them, by contributing to consolidate the order which is necessary to maintain the external and internal peace of the kingdom. We order our armies both by sea and land, to look upon, and receive that of our august allies as a force, which is only acting for the real welfare of our kingdom; and which far from being sent to subjugate our people, or to load them with taxes for the support of a useless war, is authorized to make common cause with our armies, for the preservation of tranquillity and the protection of the real friends of their country, who are also the faithful subjects of their king.

FERDINAND.

Laybach, 25th February, 1821.

No. XXI.

PROCLAMATION OF GENERAL FRIMONT, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE AUSTRIAN ARMY, TO THE NEAPOLITANS.

NEAPOLITANS,

AT the moment when the army under my command sets foot within the frontiers of the kingdom of Naples, I feel myself bound to declare openly and frankly the object of my operations.

A deplorable revolution, in the month of July last, has disturbed your internal tranquillity, and broken the friendly relations which, between neighbouring states, can only rest on the fundamental basis of reciprocal confidence.

The king has made his royal and paternal voice be heard by his people; he has warned you against the horrors of a useless war; of a war, which is not directed against you, and which your own actions alone can bring down upon you.

The ancient and faithful allies of the kingdom have on their side also addressed you; they have themselves duties to fulfil to their people; but still they are not strangers to your real and permanent felicity, which you will never find on the road of rebellion, or by proving false to your duties. Reject voluntarily a production which is foreign to you, and trust to your king; your interests and his are inseparably united.

In entering the limits of the kingdom, no hostile intention actuates us. The army under my command will look upon and treat as friends all the Neapolitans who are faithful to their king, and friends of tranquillity. It will maintain the strictest disci-

pline everywhere, and will only consider as enemies those who venture to oppose it.

Neapolitans, listen to the voice of your king, and of his friends, who are also yours. Reflect upon the miseries which you will draw upon yourselves by a vain resistance ; be assured that the fleeting ideas with which the enemies of order and tranquillity, who are also your enemies, seek to dazzle you, can never become the source of your prosperity.

Given at our head quarters, at Foligno, 27th February, 1821.

(Signed)

JOHN, BARON DE FRIMONT,

Commander in Chief.

No. XXII.

LETTER FROM THE PARLIAMENT TO THE KING,
sent by GENERAL FARDELLA.

SIRE,

YOUR Majesty will allow us to express to you the extreme affliction we feel, and which has been produced by circumstances, the principal of which at least are known to you. We were living tranquilly in the bosoms of our families, and were so on the 2nd. of July, last year. Your Majesty, through the medium of your august Son, thought proper to call us from them, and by convoking the electoral assemblies, authorized our nomination. Your Majesty dictated the formula of our powers, and prescribed to us the basis of our oaths. In the exercise of all our functions, we conceived ourselves to be only conforming to your Majesty's pleasure, corresponding with the wishes of the people. When your Majesty departed for the Congress at Laybach, you condescended to accept that mission for the purpose of preserving to us our present Constitution. In the documents which were subsequently communicated to us, your Majesty expressed clearly the painful situation and disagreeable circumstances in which you were placed, when you found it impossible to avert the resolution of your allies. Recollecting every thing that your Majesty had said, and which the Regent and ourselves had heard from your Majesty's own mouth, we were led to suppose that in subsequently making declarations

entirely opposite, your Majesty must have been in a state of constraint.

A proclamation, however, has been recently distributed in your Majesty's name, which would lead us to believe that your Majesty was perfectly free, and that you disapproved altogether the system of which you had been the founder. We have also learned that your Majesty was at Florence, and that you were advancing towards Rome. In conjunction with these movements of your Majesty, we learn that a powerful Austrian army has already crossed our frontiers, and threatens with destruction every thing we hold dear.

Sire! your Majesty's pleasure has always been respected by the nation. Your Majesty's name was never pronounced with greater veneration and affection, than at the period of your establishing a Constitution among us. All our plans, all our acts, bear the impression of the warmest love and attachment to you, and we have only enjoyed liberty under the limits, and in the manner, prescribed by your Majesty.

If your Majesty now thinks it desireable that we should deviate in some points from the system previously adopted, condescend to appear once more in the midst of your people, disclose to us in our family meeting your Majesty's real inclinations, and prepare to state frankly what ameliorations you consider necessary to our present system. Your people, Sire, will be satisfied to maintain that just and noble concord with your Majesty, of which they have hitherto been proud, and which they will always feel to be their duty. But let not strangers

Sire, let not foreigners pretend to interfere between the nation and its head. Let it not be said, that their presence was necessary to inspire a people, who love and respect their monarch, with docility, attachment, and confidence toward him. Let not our laws be tinged with the blood of our enemies, or with that of our brethren. Finally, let your Majesty's throne derive its stability entirely from the hearts of your own people, and not from the swords of strangers.

We confide these wishes, Sire, to the same God, who witnessed our reciprocal engagements, our loyal intentions, and your Majesty's paternal cares. We have no doubt but the benevolent heart of your Majesty will receive and render them effectual. We venture to assure your Majesty, that your own glory, our honor, and the general felicity will be the certain results.

In the mean time, Sire, be persuaded that all we have done or may do, will be always conformable to these sentiments, which are besides those of your Majesty.

Naples, March 12, 1821.

No. XXIII.

DECREE OF THE REGENT

For the re-organization of the Second Corps of the Army.

Ministry of War, No. 2743.

Naples, March 14, 1821.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

HIS Royal Highness, the Prince Regent has given orders that your Excellency shall organize a second corps of the army between the two Principalities. It will be composed of

1. The skeletons of the battalions of the preceding corps, which will be dispatched to Montefusco by the commander in chief of the first corps. These skeletons are to be filled up by soldiers taken from among those on furlough, who are now serving in the battalions of Militia and Legionaries, according to the decree of the inst. and by recruits, whom your Excellency may take from the different recruiting depots of the kingdom, who have received directions to that effect.
2. A battalion of gendarmes.
3. The sacred squadron, which is rated at 160 horses.
4. Several battalions of Militia and Legionaries, now at Naples, who will join you, and for which I have given correspondent orders to the Governor of Naples.
5. Free battalions, corps, and companies, which have been organized at Naples, or elsewhere.
6. Other battalions of Militia and Legionaries, which your Excellency thinks you may be able to organize in the two Principalities, or in the Capitanata. When I can ascertain the strength and situation of the second regiment of horse chasseurs, I will take care to expedite it to the corps which you command.

The said corps will be formed into four brigades, to be commanded by Generals Verdinois, Montemajor, Mari and Aquino. The three first will repair to Montefusco, as soon as I can ascertain their position, and they can leave the troops now under their command in the Abruzzi. I will take care that General Russo, as soon as he has effected his junction with the first corps, shall receive a destination in the second corps.

I will give orders that all the unattached officers, who have been placed at your Excellency's disposition, shall repair to Montefusco as fast as they return from the Abruzzi.

The Councillor of State, Borelli, will remain with the second corps; I have also arranged that the paymaster general Gazzara, and the Commissary General Tolva, (until his colleague Morales arrives) shall attend your Excellency to exercise their functions in the corps which you command.

I should also apprise you, that I have ordered the battalions of Calabrese militia, who were on their march, to halt at Salerno, and wait your Excellency's orders as to their future destination. Besides I have written to those from Apulia, to halt at Avellino, for the same purpose.

I shall give orders that the corps which you are about to organize shall have an hospital, a waggon train, and magazines of provisions.

I shall wait until the artillery of the late second corps has made its retreat from Volturmo, to forward the whole or a part of it to the new second corps.

COLLETA.

Minister at War.

To His Excellency,

General William Pepe, &c. &c. &c.

No. XXIV.

LETTER FROM THE DEPUTIES OF THE CORTES OF
SPAIN TO GENERAL PEPE, *on his arrival at Barcelona.**

Madrid, 2nd May, 1821.

GENERAL,

As lovers of liberty, we cannot refrain from paying a public homage to the man who exposed his all to defend her; this consideration obliges us to offer you our friendship, our respect, and our purses. If you have lost a country for having attached yourself to the noblest of causes, be assured that we will lose ours, sooner than you shall not find in Spain the asylum and reward which free men can offer to real heroes, be they of whatever country they may.

Be pleased to accept these real sentiments, dictated by the

* General Pepe landed about the 28th April, at Barcelona; the Captain General Villa Campa, the political chief, and the whole population of Barcelona, painfully affected by the disasters of the Neapolitans, welcomed him with those patriotic sentiments which distinguish the Catalonians. General Pepe took an opportunity of expressing his gratitude to them, and he has inserted among these documents the above letter, which was written to him by the deputies of the Cortes; not from believing himself deserving the compliments there paid him, but to show that the generosity of the Spanish character is not altered by circumstances, or the inconstancy of fortune.

sympathy which unites all free men, who profess the same principles.

We are, with the highest consideration,

Your most devoted servants and friends,

DIAZ DE MORALES,

ALVARO FLORES ESTRADA,

JOSE MORENO DE GUERRA,

LORENZO DE GAVALA,

JUAN ROMERO ALPUENTE,

MANUEL GARCIA SIRA,

JUAN LOPEZ CONSTANTE

No. XXV.

SPEECH OF THE DEPUTY POERIO, IN PARLIAMENT,
19th *March*, 1821.

“THE national parliament, summoned by virtue of the political Statute adopted by the King, installed by his Majesty in person in their first session, and by his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, in their present session, is necessarily and absolutely a legal parliament. If the unheard-of catastrophes which have befallen the army, the causes of which history will some day develope, could have diminished our strength, they could not diminish our rights. What therefore, are we bound to do?—To continue our sittings,—and never to separate the cause of the nation from that of the King, and his august Son, the heir to the throne. On the other hand the parliament cannot be constitutionally in activity, without the concurrence of the executive power. Let us continue to follow the path of legitimacy and honor. Let us remain firmly at our posts. Let us wait with confidence the results of our last message to his Majesty, and if the presence of a foreign army forces us to separate, let us protest before God and man, for the independence of the nation and the throne. Military disasters ought not to depress civil courage. Is it our wish to give proofs of our profound respect for the king? Let us not dishonor the people of whom He is the head and the father.”

The speaker was seconded by the president Arcovito, and the deputies Nicolai, Dragonetti, Carlini, Melchiore, Da Luca, Antonini, and Morici.

No. XXVI.

*PROTEST, adopted and decreed in Secret Committee, by the NATIONAL PARLIAMENT, in the morning of the 19th of March, 1821, on the motion of the Deputy Poerio, and signed by Twenty-five Members, including the mover.**

AFTER the publication of the social compact of the 7th July, 1820, by which his Majesty signified his adhesion to the present Constitution, the King, through the medium of his august Son, convoked the electoral assemblies; nominated by them, we re-

* The conduct of the deputy Baron Joseph Poerio, author of the motion relative to the protest of the national representation, deserves particular notice. Forgetting the claims upon him as a tender father, and an affectionate husband, forgetting also the miseries he had endured in 1799, when he was condemned to death, his thoughts were solely directed to the maintenance and defence of their dearest rights, which his fellow citizens, the Calabrians, had entrusted to his eloquence and patriotism. And as it is of importance to draw a veil as much as possible over the faults and weaknesses of mankind, and to give publicity to those virtues which merit admiration, I feel happy in stating that the deputy Poerio refused a place of the first importance, which was offered him in the first three months of the constitutional government, with the condition of his nominating a substitute in the event of his being elected a deputy. I ought to add that he and his wife, rivalling the Spartan women, but without suppressing her tears, entrusted me with their eldest son, only eighteen years of age, saying, "In allowing him to depart for the Abruzzi, we prefer that he should follow the general who will first meet the

ceived our summonses according to the forms which the monarch himself had prescribed. We have exercised our functions conformably to our powers, and to the oaths taken by the King, and by ourselves. But the presence of a foreign army in the kingdom puts us under the necessity of suspending them, which is so much the stronger, as his Royal Highness the Prince Regent informs us, that the late military disasters render the translation of the parliament a matter of impossibility ; the parliament cannot besides be constitutionally in activity without the concurrence of the executive power. In announcing this deplorable fact, we protest against the violation of the law of nations ; we reserve the rights of the nation and the King ; we appeal to the wisdom of his Royal Highness, and his august Father, and we commit the cause of the throne and our national independence into the hands of that God, who directs the destinies of kings and people.

Parliamentary Note.

In the sitting of the 20th, the parliament decided, in *Secret Committee*, that the above protest should not be signed by the deputies ; but that it should be entered like other parliamentary acts, in the journals of the day, with the signatures of the president and secretaries.

enemies of our country ; for we shall in that way either reach the summit of glory, or become the most wretched creatures on earth."

I cannot likewise refrain from mentioning the President of the Parliament, Hieronimo Arcovito, whose firmness and patriotic conduct fully justified the confidence of his colleagues in nominating him to the Presidency at a crisis so difficult.

In the *public* sitting of the 21st, the parliament, upon the motion of the deputy Poerio, seconded by the deputies Dragonetti and Nicolai, resolved unanimously to continue its sittings until the presence of a foreign army should render it impossible.

Finally, on the 24th of March, while the Austrian army was making its entry into the capital, twenty-two of the deputies assembled in the usual place of meeting, and waited the arrival of their colleagues until two o'clock, the hour at which the morning sittings usually terminated; finding themselves in too small number to deliberate, and considering the presence of a foreign army, they declared themselves obliged to separate, without being able to deliberate in conformity to their duties.

An hour after this decision, an armed force entered the hall of parliament, which was shut, and sealed by order of the police.

No. XXVII.

NOMINATION OF GENERAL PEPE

To be a Councillor of State.

Naples, 13th September, 1820.

FERDINAND I. by the Grace of God and the Constitution of the Monarchy, King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

CONSIDERING the proposition made to us by the National Parliament, for the formation of a Council of State, and using the powers established by the Constitution, we have resolved to decree, and decree as follows:—

1. We nominate Lieutenant General William Pepe to be a Councillor of State.
2. All the ministers, secretaries of state, are charged with the execution of the present decree.

FERDINAND.

A true copy.

The Secretary of State, *ad interim*,

Minister of Grace and Justice,

GIACINTO TROISI.



No. XXVIII.

SECRET CONVENTION BETWEEN THE COURT OF AUSTRIA
AND THAT OF NAPLES.*Article of the Treaty concluded at Vienna, 12th June, 1815.*

THE engagements which their Majesties contract by this treaty to secure the internal peace of Italy, rendering it incumbent upon them to preserve their respective states and subjects from fresh re-actions, and from the danger of imprudent innovations which would lead to their return, it remains understood between the high contracting parties that his Majesty the king of the Two Sicilies, on re-establishing the government of his kingdom, shall admit of no changes, which cannot be conciliated either with the ancient monarchical constitutions, or with the principles adopted by H. I. and R. A. Majesty for the internal government of his Italian provinces.

THE END.

ERRATA.

Page 13, line 20, for *marshes*, read *marches*.

— 32, — 4, } for *St. Angelo*, read *St. Elmo*.
— 61, — 21, }

— 77, — 10, for *was*, read *were*.

— 113, after the Postscript, add—*This document was never received by General Pepe.*

Pepe, Guglielmo,

A Narrative of the Political and Military Events, which took place, at
Naples, in 1820 and 1821 with Observations explanatory of the National
Conduct in general, and of his own in particular during that Period ; With
an Appendix of Official Documents the greater part hitherto unpublished

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